Who Upholds Your Human Rights When You are “Stateless?” Why Couldn’t the UN Protect the Rohingya’s Human Rights? by Lee, Hyochan
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Student Theses Baruch College 
Fall 12-18-2020 
Who Upholds Your Human Rights When You are “Stateless?” Why 
Couldn’t the UN Protect the Rohingya’s Human Rights? 
Hyochan Lee 
CUNY Bernard M Baruch College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/105 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 









Who Upholds Your Human Rights When You are “Stateless?” 




By: Hyochan Lee 
 
Submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Honors at Baruch College of the City University 
of New York in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 
Political Science with Honors. 
 
Date: December 7, 2020 
 
______________________________  





 ______________________________ ______________________________ 








  ​Lee 2 
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6 
ABSTRACT 7 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 9 
Brief History of Human Rights 11 
International Human Rights Regime 13 
Research Procedure 14 
Historical Institutionalism & Path Dependency 15 
Process Tracing & Path Dependency 16 
Four Design Flaws 17 
Structure of the Argument 19 
CHAPTER 2 – NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STATE, AND THE STATELESS 20 
Introduction 20 
The Principle of Westphalian Sovereignty 20 
States as a Key Actor and their Role (Internationally & Domestically) 21 
Internationally 21 
Domestically 23 
Stateless People 23 
Defining Stateless 23 
How do people find themselves stateless? 24 
De Jure versus De facto 26 
Conclusion & Outlook on Statelessness 27 
CHAPTER 3 – INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: IN THE UN 29 
Introduction 29 
The Anatomy of the UN 30 
Figure 1: The UN System 31 
UN General Assembly (UNGA) 32 
UN Security Council (UNSC) 33 
Figure 2: UNSC’s functions and powers (Next page) 33 
  ​Lee 3 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 36 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 36 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 37 
UN Secretariat 38 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 39 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 41 
Figure 3: Human Rights in UN Organs 43 
UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 44 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (1943-47) 45 
UN Commission on Human Rights (1946-2006) 45 
Figure 4: UNCHR’s Nine Core International Human Rights Treaties (next page) 46 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (1950-Present) 47 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (1993-Present) 48 
UN Human Rights Council (2006-Present) 50 
UN’S INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 51 
Figure 5: Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs (1850 - 2000) (Next page) 52 
UN (1945 – 1947) 54 
Cold War (1947 – 1991) 54 
Analysis 55 
Figure 6: Human Rights Conventions (1947 - 1991) (next page) 55 
American Unipolarity (1991–2009) 58 
Figure 7: Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs (1945 - 2017) 58 
Figure 8: Human Rights Conventions (1991-2009) 59 
Analysis 59 
2010 to 2020 (2010 – 2020) 60 
Figure 9: Human Rights Conventions (2010– 2017) 61 
Analysis 61 
Conclusion —Evaluation of the UN International Legal Regime’s Ability to Protect Human 
Rights 61 
CHAPTER 4 — DESIGN FLAWS 65 
  ​Lee 4 
 
Introduction 65 
Design Flaw #1: Jurisdiction 65 
Design Flaw #2: Hierarchy of World Power 68 
Uneven Membership and Power 68 
Lack of Liability Measure Against Superpowers 69 
Design Flaw #3: Competition 71 
Use of Veto & Trend & Superpowers. 72 
State’s Selective Interest 74 
Design Flaw #4: Slow Adaptation to Change 76 
Breakdown and Emergence of New States. 77 
Figure 10: Forms of Government, 2018 (next page) 78 
Changes in Form of Government 78 
New Inclusion vs. Exclusion Policies 79 
Conclusion 79 
CHAPTER 5 – CASE STUDY: ROHINGYA​ ​MUSLIMS​ ​CRISIS​ 81 
Introduction 81 
Becoming Stateless & Life After 84 
1962 Military Coup & Rule 84 
Figure 11: Chronology 1990 - 2005 86 
Rohingya Muslim Crisis (1990 - Present) 87 
1990 The National League For Democracy & Military 87 
1st Rohingya Muslim Crisis (1991) 87 
Figure 12: Chronology 2005 - 2012 (Next Page) 89 
2nd Rohingya Muslim Crisis (2012) 91 
Figure 13: Chronology 2013-2017 (Next page) 92 
End of Military Rule - Beacon of Hope? 94 
3rd Rohingya Muslim Crisis (2016) 94 
2017 Genocide and Its Aftermath 96 
Figure 14: Chronology 2017 - 2020 (Next page) 96 
Post-Genocide Crisis Management 98 





2020 — Recent Developments Involving the World Court 105 
Rohingya Muslim Crises & The 2017 Genocide 105 
Conclusion 110 
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 111 
Introduction 111 
Recommendation 115 



















  ​Lee 6 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to thank my advisor, Professor Stephanie Golob, sincerely for her              
invaluable mentorship and support during the entire research process. Your insightful feedback            
pushed me to sharpen my thinking and brought my work to a higher level. In my academic                 
career, I have never met anyone with your level of patience, knowledge, and kindness.  
Next, I would also like to thank both Professor Thomas Halper and Professor Marcus              
Johnson, Jr. sincerely for taking their time to read my thesis and for providing me with their                 
expert opinions. I’m very grateful for their kind assistance. I would also like to thank Professor                
Alexander Panayotov for his support and feedback. He provided me with the tools that I needed                
to choose the right direction while preparing for my thesis. 
In addition, I would like to thank my mother, Cecilia, and older sister, Esther, for their                















  ​Lee 7 
 
ABSTRACT 
In 2017, a genocide in Myanmar took place against the stateless minority Rohingya             
Muslims. Why couldn’t the UN protect the Rohingya’s human rights? The international            
community's efforts to oppose these violations against the stateless people have been only             
passive. Then, who upholds your human rights when you are stateless? Using chronology,             
historical institutionalism, and process tracing analyses, this thesis (1) evaluates the UN’s legal             
regime’s systemic design and capabilities in protecting human rights; then (2) identifies the             
design flaws of our international human rights regime; and lastly, (3) develops a recommendation              
to protect all people, stateless or not. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data on               
established human rights institutions, documents, mechanisms and efforts, and the UN’s           
handling of Rohingya Genocide as a case study, this thesis argues that I will argue that the UN                  
was unable to protect the Rohingya’s human rights because there is a set of flaws within its                 
institutional systemic design, which limits its ability to intervene and address humanitarian            
crises. It identifies the four critical systemic ​design flaws ​which explain why the UN’s ability to                
protect all people is limited and inconsistent. Previously, scholars have suggested creating           
comprehensive refugee/stateless laws and making the Universal Declaration of Human Right,           
and 1954 and 1961 the Statelessness Conventions legally binding as a solution.​1 This thesis              
recommends an alternate solution: Project Global Citizenship. As a formerly undocumented           
immigrant, I continue to find this topic compelling for people of our generation to care and find                 
justice for vulnerable people our governments have neglected. 
 
 
1 Kaveri, “Being Stateless and the Plight of Rohingyas,” ​Peace Review​ 29, no. 1 (February 2017): pp. 31-39, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1272295. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The international legal definition of a stateless person: “​A person who is not             
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law​”.​2 
—  ​Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) 
Three years ago, in 2017, the world was shaken with news that another tragic genocide               
was taking place against the “stateless” minority, the Rohingya Muslim people, in Myanmar.             
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, pursuant to the 1954             
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the legal definition for stateless persons is               
people who are “individuals who are not considered citizens or nationals under the operation of               
the laws of any country” (UNHCR, 1954). Furthermore, according to UNHCR, there are millions              
of people around the world who are “stateless” today (UNHCR). In comparison to the Rohingya               
Crisis, there is a horrific historical precedent which may be familiar to many, the genocide of                
European Jews in the Nazi Holocaust between 1941 and 1945. In the aftermath of the Second                
World War, the United Nations was formed in 1945, motivated by 51 countries committing to               
maintain international peace and security, and to prevent future human rights atrocities like the              
Nazi genocide and Japanese war crimes. All these decades later and everything the world has               
been through, why are stateless people and the Rohingyas still left without protection? The              
protection of Rohingya People’s human rights would presumably fall under the UN’s            
jurisdiction, as the UN’s founding Charter mentions and promotes the protection of human rights              
seven times, and lastly, its preamble in their Charter set one of their objectives as to uphold the                  
international laws and treaties (UN). Where was the UN when the vulnerable Rohingya             
Muslims’ human rights were being violated? Some scholars like Kate Cronin-Furman, a human             
rights professor at University College London, and institutions, such as the United States             
2 UN, “Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,” opened for signature June 6, 1960, ​Treaty Series​ 360, 
no. 5158 (1954):136, treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20360/v360.pdf 
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Holocaust Memorial Museum, even contend that the world knew that the Genocide was going to               
happen ahead of time, as early as 2015.​3 Whether the world knew early as of 2015 or not, this                   
presents an interesting two-part puzzle: Why could not the UN protect the Rohingya’s human              
rights? (“First Part”) Secondly, if the UN could not, then who upholds your human rights when                
you are stateless? (“Second Part”) 
In this thesis, I will argue that the UN was unable to ​protect the Rohingya’s human rights                 
because there is ​a set of flaws within its institutional systemic design, which limits its ability to                 
intervene and address humanitarian crises. 
This inability to intervene and protect the Rohingya’s human rights was caused by ​path               
dependent effects,​4 meaning that over time the design flaws were never fixed, and improvement              
or change was not possible. I examined the Rohingya case chronologically to identify "critical              
junctures," when change might have been possible. I identified two such critical junctures: 1962,              
when the military took over and enforced exclusionary ideology and there was no UN pushback;               
and then 2015, when it looked like an election could weaken the military's hold and allow the                 
UN to have more influence/protect the Rohingya. But in reality they were able to continue               
enforcing their ideology against the Rohingya, without UN pushback. 
In particular, the second part can be broken down to two separate questions: an objective               
and empirical question of which international, regional, and domestic actors or authorities are             
capable of protecting human rights; and a normative question of who should protect your human               
rights. I will argue that within the international ​human rights regime, states, and IGOs, are the                
main actors capable of upholding your human rights when you are stateless, in Chapters 2 and 3.​5                 
3 Kate Cronin-Furman, “The World Knew Ahead of Time the Rohingya Were Facing Genocide,”​ Foreign Policy​, 
September 19, 2017, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/19/the-world-knew-ahead-of-time-the-rohingya-were-facing-genocide/. 
4 I would like to thank Professor Stephanie Golob, my thesis advisor, and Professor Marcus Johnson, one of my 
departmental readers, for bringing this to my attention. 
5 For the purpose of this study, the scope of this study will only consider the states, and IGOs.  
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However, in Chapter 5, I will also argue that while these actors, and this regime, may be capable,                  
no one will uphold your human rights when you are stateless, or at least not consistently. 
I. Brief History of Human Rights 
Today, the most widely accepted definition of human rights is “rights inherent to all              
human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other             
status,” according to the United Nations.​6 Although this concept and definition is relatively a              
new international norm which was constructed and developed to protect all people in the last 75                
years, its fundamental root and foundation goes back much further in history. Researchers at the               
University of Minnesota's Human Rights Resource Center, claim that in history, rights and             
responsibilities were first acquired through their membership in a group – such as a family,               
indigenous nation, religion, class, community, or state.”​7 Then, societies began establishing the            
social value of rights and wrongs and rules such as "treat others like how you want to be treated"                   
or an “eye for an eye,” in their traditions, according to German-American philosopher Walter              
Kaufmann.​8 Over time, all societies had some level of ideas and principles of propriety and               
justice in their system, whether orally or in writing.​9 In fact, some of the oldest writings that                 
possess and address the ideas of people’s duties, rights, and responsibilities in record are the               
Bible, the Quran, the Hindu Vedas, the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi and the Analects of               
Confucius.​10 Other notable human rights documents in history are the Magna Carta of 1215, the               
6 UN, “Human Rights,” United Nations (United Nations), accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/. 
7 Nancy Flowers, ed, ​Human Rights Here and Now:Celebrating the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights​. Part I:  A Short History of Human Rights. ​Human Rights Educators' Network of Amnesty 
International USA, the Human Rights Resource Center, and the Stanley Foundation, 1998​, accessed and verified on 
November 29, 2020, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm. 
8 Walter Kaufmann, "The Origin of Justice," ​The Review of Metaphysics​ 23, no. 2 (1969): 209-39, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20125533. 
9 ​ibid. 
10 Nancy Flowers, ed, ​op. cit. 
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English Bill of Rights of 1689, the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789,                  
and the US Constitution and Bill of Rights of 1791. 
Many of the modern concepts of human rights and even writers of some of the famous                
human rights documents such as the US Declaration of Independence, and Bill of Rights of               
1791, are believed to have derived ideas from the English philosopher John Locke’s Second              
Treatise of Government, where Locke advocated for natural rights, in 1689.​11 Locke theorized             
that all individuals are born with certain "inalienable" natural rights — God-given rights, which              
can never be taken or even given away. Rights to “life, liberty, and property,” popularly               
associated with political theory of Liberalism, are Locke’s ideas. Following Locke’s ideas and             
the American Revolution, many countries have incorporated them into their political systems and             
scholars, also known as natural rights theorists, theorized about the concept of natural rights. 
To date, basing human nature as the source of the rights— according to Jack Donnelly in                
his essay “Human Rights as Natural Rights” in ​Human Rights Quarterly ​— natural rights              
theorists have established three different types with minor subtle differences: ​natural rights, the             
rights of man, ​and human rights​.​12 They all differ based on where they claim the source of our                  
rights are from, respectively. For example, natural rights stress a grounding in human nature.              
Meanwhile, the rights of man suggest man as the source of rights. It is to the extent that man is                    
viewed as not merely natural, but rational and moral. This suggests a more complicated, and               
probably more illuminating, source for these rights. As for human rights, similar to both natural               
rights and the rights of man, it suggests a derivation of rights from the complex moral notion of                  
humanity.  
11 Constitutional Rights Foundation, “Natural Rights,” 2001, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/natural-rights.html.  
12 ​Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights as Natural Rights,” ​Human Rights Quarterly​ 4, no. 3 (1982): pp. 391-405, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/762225, 391. 
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Moreover, natural rights in general can also be distinguished into negative and positive             
rights. A distinction between negative and positive rights is that the negative right is entitlement               
to non-interference, while positive right is entitlement to provision of some good or service. To               
better understand the concept, some of the examples of negative rights are civil and political               
rights such as freedom of speech, life, private property, freedom of religion, and a fair trial.                
Some of the examples of positive rights are police protection of person and property, the right to                 
counsel, as well as rights to food, housing, public education, employment, and a minimum              
standard of living. Traditionally, natural rights were viewed as exclusively negative rights,            
whereas human rights also comprise positive rights. 
II. International Human Rights Regime 
Contrary to the common assumption, the UN is neither a synonym of global governance              
nor a sole machine or a system which the world runs by. In fact, the UN is only just part of what                      
an international regime is.  
So, what is an international regime? Post-World War II, with the increase in             
interdependence and cooperation among states, there were dilemmas in the coordination and            
organization of international relations, law, order, authority, and organizations. Historically,          
many scholars used different theories such as realism, liberalism and constructivism to describe,             
explain, and predict various aspects of international relations and to define what an international              
regime is. The most widely accepted definition of an international regime is by international              
relations theorist Stephen D. Krasner. In his 1982 journal article “Structural causes and regime              
consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” he defines an international regime as “implicit            
or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors'           
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” In other words, the international              
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regime is an international process and collection of rules. According to Robert O. Keohane’s              
1982 journal article “The Demand for International Regimes,” the major function of international             
regimes is to “facilitate the making of specific agreements on matters of substantive significance              
within the issue-area covered by the regime.” This main function of international regimes can be               
found in different forms and types such as international conventions, treaties, and international             
organizations, including both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. As        
Krasner and Keohane described, international regimes consist of many actors, such as states,             
IGOs, NGOs, etc. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I am going to focus on one category                  
of actors:  international governmental organizations, or IGOs, whose members are states.​13 
III. Research Procedure 
There are many studies and literatures on human rights, the stateless, and even on the               
Rohingya Muslim Crisis, ​which focused primarily ​on the actions of states that violate human              
rights​14 and/or have taken snapshots on institutions at the time.​15 Unlike these previous studies,              
this thesis offers a long term view over how human rights institutions developed over time.               
Again, the main puzzles that this thesis focuses on are: ​Why couldn't the UN protect the                
Rohingya’s human rights?​; and ​Who upholds your human rights when you are stateless?​. ​My              
answer comes in three parts: first, describing the international human rights regime and             
identifying the main actors that are capable of protecting human rights — States, and IGOs               
(including the UN)— and their roles, and second, identifying the design flaws of our              
13 ​ I would like to thank Professor Thomas Halper, one of my departmental readers, for bringing this to my attention. 
14 For example, see Nicolas Rost, “Human Rights Violations, Weak States, and Civil War,” ​Human Rights Review 
12, no. 4 (January 2011): pp. 417-440, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-011-0196-9. 
15 For instance, see Volker Heins, Aditya Badami, and Andrei S. Markovits, “The West Divided? A Snapshot of 
Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations at the United Nations,” ​Human Rights Review​ 11, no. 1 (2009): pp. 1-16, 
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0133-3. 
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international human rights regime. Finally, I demonstrate the causal connection​16 between the            
design flaws and the Rohingya Muslim Human Rights Crisis. 
In the next section of this chapter, I will develop three interrelated concepts that I will use                 
to construct my answers to these puzzles: historical institutionalism, path dependency, and            
process tracing, and systemic design flaws; and lastly make the connection to Rohingya Muslim              
human rights crisis.  
Historical Institutionalism & Path Dependency 
To understand why the UN’s human rights regime looks the way it does today, I first                
began the research by mapping out the development of the international human rights regime.              
Next, I traced what human rights institutions came about at what time and how they changed                
over time, from 1945 to present (2020). I identified the following ​critical junctures ​where there               
was either a major systemic changes or institutional growth within the UN’s human rights              
regime: the end of WWII and the creation of the United Nations (1945); start of Cold War (1947)                  
with Truman Doctrine; rise of the American Unipolarity (1989) and end of Cold War with               
collapse of Soviet Union (1991); and the end of the American Unipolarity, and the rise of                
Multipolar world (2009​-​). From each of these critical junctures, I looked at the context behind               
“why” some of these Human Rights institutions or instruments were created, as well as why               
some were closed off and not others. As a result of this historical institutionalism and chronology                
analyses, one of the reasons why the UN is the way it is right now is because one of the key                     
actors in the international regime are states. Sovereignty gives states the authority not only over               
their territory and people, but also over powers they delegate to international institutions.             
16 ​I am using this term “causal connection” and recognize that in a single case study I cannot prove causality, 
however,  I do think that my case does point to future research in comparative case studies. I would like to thank 
Professor Marcus Johnson, one of my departmental readers, for bringing this to my attention. 
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Furthermore, they create international law and norms and have the freedom to either comply or               
to not.  
Process Tracing & Path Dependency 
To understand how the crises and genocide took place in 2017 and the UN’s response, I                
traced and constructed a detailed chronologies from Rohingya’s history to post-2017 genocide            
and the UN’s effort, following the “process tracing” qualitative analysis method. Plotting events             
chronologically with detailed summaries, allows us to see how a certain outcome came about as               
a result of the convergence of several conditions, causal chains, and independent variables,             
according to David Collier.​17 Then, I observed which variables or conditions would cause and              
lead to these effects. 
As a result of the process tracing method, I identified two moments — 1962 and 2015 —                 
as ​critical junctures ​when the UN might have had the opportunity to save Rohingya from the                
path of becoming stateless, experiencing decades of persecution and violence, and going through             
the gruesome genocide in 2017, but ultimately was unable to take that new path due to political                 
regime changes. First in 1962, following the coup, after Burma’s form of government changed              
from General Aung San’s democratic regime to General Ne Win’s military regime, the             
international human rights regime had up to 1974 to either pressure the Junta to restore the                
democratic system or even to sign onto many human rights conventions, especially on             
statelessness. With no opposition both domestically and internationally, the junta’s rule           
continued. Their continued rule eventually stripped the Rohingyas’ citizenship, making them           
stateless by 1982, and successfully ostracized and supported various violent campaigns and            
17 ​David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics, 44, Issue 4 (October 2011): 
823-830, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/understanding-process-tracing/183
A057AD6A36783E678CB37440346D1. 
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persecutions against the Rohingyas. Then, again, in 2015, when the National League for             
Democracy party led by Nobel Peace prize laureate and the current Counsellor of Myanmar,              
Aung San Suu Kyi, won, the international human rights regime had up to 2017, to either pressure                 
the Suu Kyi’s regime to restore Rohingya’s citizenship and to resolve the interethnic conflict              
between Burmese majority and Rohingyas; or to utilize the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ to step in,               
in light of previous crises in 1991, 2006, and/or 2016. 
These two key moments became ​critical junctures​, in which I looked at how they              
contributed to “​path dependency​.” According to scholar Paul A. David, path dependency            
analysis, looks at critical junctures and reflects on how the decisions made during this time               
limited the trajectory of the future.​18 Studying these two defining moments offered this thesis the               
spectrum of choices and decisions made by Myanmar, the UN, and other powerful actors that               
helped explain why the UN's mechanism for protecting stateless people and their rights today is               
the way it is in its current condition of ineffectiveness.  
IV. Four Design Flaws 
In this section, I am going to discuss the existence of multiple systemic design flaws that                
limit the UN’s ability to protect all people, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4 (“Design                 
Flaws”.  
Jurisdiction. ​The first Design Flaw is ‘jurisdiction.’ Many States still retain a lot of power               
over how they treat their citizens, and as a result, this limits the UN’s limited jurisdiction in                 
states’ affairs and delays the protection of human rights from taking place on time. Sometimes,               
as we will note in the case of Rohingya genocide later in chapter 5, the state blatantly denies                  
18 ​Paul David, “Path Dependence, Its Critics, and the Quest for 'Historical Economics',” ​EconPapers​, January 1, 
1970, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/elgeechap/12603_5f7.htm.  
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even the UN’s investigation from taking place. This goes to show how state sovereignty can be                
used to undermine the international human rights regime’s authority. This will be later further              
discussed in Chapter 4. 
Hierarchy of World Power. ​The ​second Design Flaw is the Hierarchy of World Power in               
the UN. Although the UN is presented as an equal membership IGO, based on the United                
Nations General Assembly’s “one state, one vote” policy, in practice, some states have either              
greater or lesser power and influence within the system usually based on the world’s power               
structure, measured by combined means of economic, military, technological and cultural           
strength as well as diplomatic and soft power influence. This is especially apparent in the uneven                
membership and power balance within the United Nation Security Council. The permanent            
membership and veto power of the five permanent members (the P-5) in the Council give the P-5                 
superpowers an unfair influence over all the important decisions involving international security            
and peace matters. This will be later further discussed in Chapter 4. 
Competition​. The third Design Flaw is competition. In the study of the UN's structure and               
role in the international human rights regime, for their selective interest​, States have either              
attempted to join or joined specific UN bodies to gain a say and/or influence over world matters                 
and international norms, this was apparent in the case of certain human rights bodies and               
especially the Council. In other cases, the UN’s human rights regime’s decision making and              
moves in certain international human rights matters and/or concerns seemed to vary based on the               
state's selective interest or political will. In the UN’s history of enforcement of bringing peace               
and protection of human rights, there are cases where states’ selective interest, driven by either               
competition or for its own needs, has either delayed or prevented an action by the UN. This will                  
be later further discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Slow Adaptation to Change. The fourth Design Flaw is the UN’s slow adaptation to              
change.​19 In the history of the UN, whenever there are cases of breakdown and emergence of                
new States; or when a state’s form of government changes; and/or when a state creates a new                 
inclusion or exclusion policy, it does not have any preventive measures against it or at least its                 
measures are slow and inefficient. This will be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 with the                 
case study of Rohingya Muslim crisis and genocide. 
V. Structure of the Argument 
This thesis is organized in the following order. First, in chapter 2, I explain why our                
human rights vary state-by-state, present the role of a state, and about the stateless people. In the                 
following chapter, I provide background information about the intention behind the creation of             
the UN, the anatomy of the UN, human rights institutions, UN’s Institutional Evolution, as well               
as the evaluation of the un international legal regime’s ability to protect human rights. In Chapter                
4, I discuss the four critical systemic design flaws in more details. Chapter 5 presents the case                 
study of Rohingya Muslim Crisis and the genocide, focusing on the UN’s role, and              
demonstrating how the Design Flaws were at play following path dependency. Finally, the             
concluding chapter presents this thesis’ findings and recommendation for overcoming the           






19 ​ I would like to thank Professor Marcus Johnson, one of my departmental readers, for the name suggestion for this 
design flaw. 
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CHAPTER 2 – NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STATE, AND THE STATELESS 
I. Introduction 
Human rights, as discussed in Chapter 1, are rights that are supposed to be based on people’s                 
humanity. In other words, they are rights we have simply because we exist as humans and they                 
are not granted by any state. Yet, in reality, why do our human rights vary state-by-state? It is                  
because the political entity that really controls our human rights are our national governments.              
This concept of how each state’s exclusive sovereignty over its territory prevails over our human               
rights will be explained with the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, in the context of              
international law. In particular, the group of people that are most vulnerable to the fact that the                 
state controls how they treat their citizens are stateless people. In this chapter, I am going to first                  
delve into the principle of Westphalian Sovereignty. Then, I will discuss the state's role as a key                 
actor in human rights, and explore more about stateless people, by providing a general              
background on who the stateless people are; how people find themselves stateless; and what it               
means to be a ​De Jure​ versus a ​De facto ​stateless person.  
II. The Principle of Westphalian Sovereignty  
Pursuant to the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, or state sovereignty—each state has            
an exclusive power or authority over its territory. This principle of self-determination and             
non-interference can be historically traced to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the end of the Thirty                
Years War (1618- 1648), and then was further developed in the 18th century.  
Henry Kissinger, former United States Secretary of State, notes that Westphalian           
sovereignty is “a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other's             
domestic affairs and checking each other's ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.”​20             
20 Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2015), 3.  
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Under this system, each state would acknowledge its fellow states’ domestic structures and             
customs and rules by refraining from challenging their existence. 
The principle of Westphalia is also protected and addressed in the United Nations             
Charter, which states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United              
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state               
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."​21 In                
other words, under the UN Charter, the UN will respect every state's right to sovereignty and                
neither infringe them nor force the states to give them up.  
Today, it is widely believed that the Westphalian system reached its peak in the 19th and                
20th centuries, but has met challenges with the advancement of communication tools like the              
internet, Facebook, and Twitter in the 21​st century and facing recent challenges from advocates              
of humanitarian intervention.​22 Furthermore, the forces of liberalization and globalization have           
also contributed to the erosion of Westphalian State Sovereignty and the gradual acceptance of              
international accountability in how states treat their citizens.​23 
III. States as a Key Actor and their Role (Internationally & Domestically) 
Internationally 
Today, there are about 195 UN recognized sovereign countries in the world. However,             
their relative importance in the international human rights regime also varies. Powerful and large              
states are more likely to play a bigger role than are smaller and less powerful states. The U.S.                  
role, also known as U.S. hegemony, is a good example of this. Historically, in particular, among                
21 UN, “Charter of the United Nations,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. 
22 Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, ​The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of A Shrinking and Fragmenting World 
Aldershot, England: E. Elgar, 1994. 
23 ​Ibid. 
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the states and scholars, the ideas and efforts behind the structure and rules of the post-WWII                
international system, promotion of multilateralism, as well as, liberal ideas in the international             
regime are often recognized and credited to the U.S.​24 The U.S.’ dominant role in developing               
and promoting these rules and structures is an example of how some states, especially              
superpowers, utilize their role and change the international system’s rules, and/or norms with its              
participation and influence.  
In contrast, since large numbers of less developed, small, and weak states, generally do              
not amount to much power and influence individually, unlike their counterpart superpowers, they             
exhibit different collective behaviors. According to scholars such as Shepard Forman and Derk             
Segaar, they collectively form coalitions to enlarge their voices and set global agenda and link               
issues of importance to them.​25 In the last couple of decades, with varying degrees of success, the                 
small states have endeavored together to shape the agendas, priorities, and the IGO’s programs. 
Transitioning to today, we are living in a multipolar world, where no one state holds the                
same power and/or the legitimacy to shape nor change the international regime like the U.S. once                
held during U.S. hegemony. Instead, we have a system with multiple emerging key state actors,               
other than the U.S., such as BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and from 2010               
South Africa, with relative power in the international regimes. Andrew Hurrell contends that the              
increase in the number of key states since 1990, are the sources of current disorder of                
international stability and regime’s inability to perform basic functions.​26  
24  ​Donald J Puchala, "World Hegemony and the United Nations," ​International Studies Review​ 7, no. 4 (2005): 
571-84, accessed and verified on November 13, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699675. 
25 ​Shepard Forman, and Derk Segaar, "New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of 
Multilateralism." ​Global Governance​ 12, no. 2 (2006): 205-25, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800610. 
26 ​Andrew Hurrell, "Rising powers and the emerging global order,"​ In The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations​, 8th ed, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, Politics Trove, 2019, accessed and verified on November 13, 2020. doi: 
10.1093/hepl/9780198825548.003.0005. 
https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/view/10.1093/hepl/9780198825548.001.0001/hepl-9780198825548-chapter-5 
  ​Lee 23 
 
Domestically 
At the national level, as Westphalian tradition postulates, ​states are responsible for how             
they treat their people. Not every state fulfills their commitment to their international human              
rights obligations. Every state is different. Just as there are some states who play the role of a                  
protector of human rights, there are states who play the role of abusers of human rights as well.                  
However, they can be usually distinguished simply by their regime type. For instance, in general,               
the authoritarian, autocratic, or socialist states are more likely to abuse political and civil rights.               
Meanwhile their counterpart liberal states are more likely to protect them. The human rights              
protector states generally take their commitment to their human rights obligations by            
internalizing and protecting human rights in their policies, laws, and institutions or by supporting              
similar human rights provisions elsewhere.​27  
In contrast, human rights violator states usually use their policies, laws, and institutions to              
discriminate or to strip or to violate or to exclude individual human rights. More often than not,                 
this also includes employing of violence and/or physical force, which are often justified with the               
excuse of state security or perceived threat. In other cases, state responsibility for human rights               
abuses also occurs when there is a lack of resources. For instance, less developed states or even                 
liberal democratic states sometimes either overlook or are unable to meet its basic obligations of               
social and/or economic rights or collective rights, simply due to lack of resources.  
IV. Stateless People 
Defining Stateless 
It was the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons which             
internationally and officially acknowledged and defined what stateless means. In Article 1 of the              
27 ​Zehra F. Arat, "Human Rights and Democracy: Expanding or Contracting?"​ Polity​ 32, no. 1 (1999): 119-44, 
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, doi:10.2307/3235336, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3235336?seq=1 
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1954 Convention, the UN defined that a “person [who is] not considered a national (or citizen)                
automatically under the laws of any State, is stateless.”​28 In simpler terms, a stateless person does                
not have a nationality of any country. Shortly after, in 1961, the Convention on the Reduction of                 
Statelessness was passed to establish international norms relating to nationality and to reduce             
statelessness over time. In effect, it established safeguards for the nationality laws concerning             
citizenship by birth and later in life, to give newborns with no nationality access to citizenship                
and to prevent states from stripping people’s nationality, turning them “stateless.”​29 
Stateless people are considered and treated differently than other groups like refugees or             
asylum seekers, internationally. To be fair, unlike an asylum-seeker or a refugee, stateless people              
are usually ostracized and have limited to no access to school, a doctor, jobs, open a bank                 
account, buy a house or even travel easily because they lack both crucial identity and travel                
documents. Meanwhile, a refugee or an asylum seeker might have an identity or travel              
documents, which is mandatory to seek refuge in most, if not all, states. 
How do people find themselves stateless? 
People find themselves stateless in many cases and with many causes as well. According              
to UNHCR, some of the causes of statelessness are when there is discrimination against              
particular ethnic or religious groups or on the basis of gender; when new States emerge, or there                 
are transfers between existing States; and also when the State’s nationality laws are exclusive.​30 
Dissolution and Emergence of New States​. When a state dissolves into two or more              
states, often residents cannot secure citizenship under the restrictive and sometimes           
28 UN, “Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,” ​op. cit. 
29 Both 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness will be explained and discussed in the following section (II). 
30 UNHCR, “Statelessness Around the World,” accessed and verified on September 17, 2020,  
from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statelessness-around-the-world.html. 
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discriminatory laws of the new states, or if the successor states lack the administrative capacity               
to register their residents or do not afford them sufficient time to register. For instance, from                
1989 to 1992, there was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the process of leading up to the                   
current fifteen independent republics, each successor state created new citizenship laws, which            
led to creation of a significant number of stateless populations.​31 
​Understanding State’s Role in Addressing Inclusion vs. Exclusion Policies. ​When           
dealing with minorities, governments have two basic options: 1) inclusion and 2) exclusion.             
According to the UN’s 2016 report ​Leaving no one behind: The imperative of inclusive              
development​, in the section about ‘Identifying Social Inclusion and Exclusion, in Chapter 1,             
‘social inclusion’ is defined as a process to bring people who have been socially excluded and                
helping them “gain the opportunities and resources necessary to participate fully in economic,             
social, political and cultural life and to enjoy a standard of living that is considered normal in the                  
society in which they live.”​32 In other words, ‘social inclusion’ is about granting individual or               
collective rights, and creating policies of assimilation. On the other hand, ‘social exclusion’ is              
defined as when “individuals are unable to participate fully in economic, social, political and              
cultural life, as well as the process leading to and sustaining such a state.”​33 Basically, social                
exclusion is when you exclude and outcast minorities from everything such as economic, social,              
political, and cultural opportunities and recognition. A couple of the contemporary cases that             
illustrate this are Rohingyas of Myanmar, Muslims in India, and Uighurs in China. 
31 Sofia Svensson, “30 Years of Statelessness in the Former Soviet Union,” International Observatory of Human 
Rights, September 13, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://observatoryihr.org/blog/30-years-of-statelessness-in-the-former-soviet-union/. 
32 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Social Inclusion, 2016 Report on the World Social 
Situation, New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 2016, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/world-social-report/rwss2016.html 
33ibid 
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De Jure versus De facto 
Prior to the passing of the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Stateless Convention of               
1954, stateless people were also considered as refugees. It was only after the Refugee and               
Stateless Conventions were passed, two were defined and recognized as separate categories. The             
creation of separate categories created a confusion and a need for clarifications on which              
convention to apply, and how to not only deal with the newly created categories of people, but                 
also people who fall into grey categories between the refugee and stateless. One of such               
confusions was people in grey categories from the stateless category: ​de jure ​and​ de facto​.  
De jure​. ​As defined from the 1954 Convention, the ​de jure ​statelessness is when a               
“person [is] not considered a national (or citizen) automatically under the laws of any State.”​34               
Simply put, stateless by law.  
De facto. ​The concept and international definition of ​de facto ​statelessness ​remain            
unaddressed as it was not included when Conventions on Statelessness was drafted and passed.              
In 2010, UNHCR’s Senior legal adviser Hugh Massey defined and conceptualized it as “persons              
outside the country of their nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail                 
themselves of the protection of that country.”​35 It is an expanded concept of ​de jure stateless that                 
one can be stateless even while possessing a nationality because they (1) do not enjoy the rights                 
attached to their nationality; or are unable to establish their nationality, or (2) are of               
undetermined nationality; or (3) in the context of State succession, are attributed the nationality              
of a State other than the State of their habitual residence. 
34 Hugh Massey, “Legal and Protection Policy Research Series: UNHCR And De Facto Statelessness,” ​UNHCR​, 
LPPR/2010/01 (April 2010): 1, ​accessed and verified on November 29, 2020. 
https://www.unhcr.org/4bc2ddeb9.pdf.  
35ibid,​ 61. 
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Thus, to date (2020), the concept of ​de jure and ​de facto statelessness are still debated.                
Currently, only ​de jure stateless people benefit under Article 1 of the Statelessness Convention              
and are granted protections under international law. 
V. Conclusion & Outlook on Statelessness 
As of 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated there to be              
more than 12 million stateless people.​36 These stateless people around the world are not only               
vulnerable to neglect, discrimination, and persecution, but also challenged daily because of their             
status and many of their natural rights are limited. In addition, with states claiming the right to                 
Westphalian sovereignty, there is often no legal protection for the stateless. Through policies of              
social exclusion they are deprived of their basic human rights, as well as others addressed and                
stressed in the UN treaties and conventions, such as the right to education, employment, housing,               
healthcare, and identity and travel documents. But they are also vulnerable when they flee. One               
of the most common issues faced by the stateless people is that their host states are not issuing                  
identity documents to them, despite their obligations under the 1954 Convention on the Status of               
Stateless Persons requiring them to do so.​37 Furthermore, stateless people are prone to prolonged              
and unwarranted imprisonment when the host state fails to address these people by either              
including them into their state or deporting them to another state.​38 
States are just as much as responsible for the creation and issue of statelessness. As a key                 
actor in the international human rights regime, it is critical for states to start recognizing               
36 ​UN, “'12 Million' Stateless People Globally, Warns UNHCR Chief in Call to States for Decisive,” November 12, 
2018, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1025561. 
37 Louise Osborne and Ruby Russell, “Stateless in Europe: 'We Are No People with No Nation',”​ The Guardian​, 
March 16, 2016, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/27/stateless-in-europe-refugee-crisis-we-are-no-people-with-no-natio
n. 
38 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating 
to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention,” Refworld, 2012, accessed and verified on 
November 29, 2020, https://www.refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html. 
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statelessness as an issue, taking responsibility in addressing the issue of statelessness, and             
protecting the stateless people’s human rights. In the next chapter, I am going to introduce an                
alternate system, which was designed and intended to be a level above the states, centered on the                 
United Nations (UN) system. Next, I will provide and lay out its anatomy and human rights                
instruments. Then, to better understand the UN's institutional formation and change from 1945 to              
present, I will be using historical institutionalism analysis. Lastly, from the insights drawn from              
the past historical “critical junctures” in the UN's history, I will demonstrate how the UN was                
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CHAPTER 3 – INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: IN THE UN 
I. Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, I argued how Westphalian sovereignty is still a very much active               
and relevant principle in world politics, and how it has established how states control how they                
treat their citizens. On the flip side, I am going to introduce the alternative system that was                 
designed to be a level above the states post-WWII—the United Nations. As a forefront              
international governmental organization (IGO) that mentions and promotes the protection of           
human rights seven times in its founding Charter, and sets one of its objectives as to uphold the                  
international laws and treaties in its preamble to its Charter, the United Nations is the one and                 
only IGO that can be held accountable for our international human rights. Furthermore, for the               
past 70 years, it was and still is the only IGOthat has the most member states world-wide, with                  
the potential to promote and protect human rights internationally. Still, to hypothesize why the              
current international human rights regime​39 looks the way it does today, I am going to evaluate                
the development of that regime from its origins in the United Nations.  
Since it was created in 1945, the International human rights regime has not been static. It                
has changed throughout history. Especially right after WWII (1945 to 1947), during the Cold              
War (1947 to 1991), and American Unipolarity (1991–2009), the international human rights            
regime experienced major international systemic changes or ​critical junctures as an institution.            
Like other international regimes, the human rights regime has also rapidly changed in recent              
decades. From 2010 to 2020, Seth D. Kaplan describes our international system as a Multipolar               
39 I recognize that a broader definition of regime may also include non-state actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the regional organizations (such as European Court of Human Rights).  However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, I am focusing on the UN, as the major international governmental organization (IGO) and the 
leader of IGOs. 
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structure.​40 After examining these critical junctures, in this chapter I will discuss the path              
dependent implications of the UN's design and capability of protecting human rights which has              
retrogressed over time. This chapter will be broken down in the following order: the Anatomy of                
the UN; UN Human Rights Instruments; and lastly, UN’s Institutional Evolution. 
II. The Anatomy of the UN 
What started off with only 51 nations in 1945, with many still colonized in Asia, the                
Middle East, and both North and Sub-Saharan Africa, today there are 193 countries out of 195                
UN recognized sovereign countries participating in the United Nations (UN).​41 Each member            
state participates in the UN differently. While many states play an active role in the UN's                
principal organs and/or its subsidiary organs, others participate in different forms and types such              
as the international conventions, treaties, and international organizations. 
The UN Charter first established the six principal organs – a General Assembly, a              
Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court             
of Justice and a Secretariat. Over time, its subsidiary organs, bodies, agencies, and programs              
were established when found necessary. As of 2020, under its five active principal organs,              
namely the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the             
International Court of Justice and the Secretariat, there are also a variety of new subsidiary               
organs, specialized agencies, commissions, departments, and offices.​42 For a visual          
representation of the UN’s system, see Figure 1: UN system on the following page. 
40 Seth D. Kaplan, “Will Human Rights Survive in a Multipolar World?,” ​The Washington Quarterly​ 42, no. 1, 
February 2019: 111-127, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2019.1593768. 
41 Ellen Kershner, “How Many Countries Are There In The World?,” ​WorldAtlas​, August 26, 2020, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/how-many-countries-are-in-the-world.html. 
42 After all Trust Territories (11, as of 1945) had attained self-government or independence, which the Charter 
assigned the Trusteeship Council to supervise, the Trusteeship Council suspended operation on November 1, 1994. 
For example, see UN, “Main Organs,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/index.html. 
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Figure 1: The UN System  
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UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
The UN General Assembly serves as the UN’s hub for all of its 193 member States’                
representatives to meet, discuss, and work together on international issues, such as development,             
peace, and security, and international law.​43 ​In terms of structure and design, the United Nations               
General Assembly was designed as the general debate arena where all UN members would be               
equally represented according to a ​one-state, one-vote formula. Meeting annually, the Assembly            
coordinates and manages all UN programs and subsidiary bodies, elections for non-permanent            
positions for other organs, and makes recommendations to its members via resolutions, such as              
those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters. 
UNGA also oversees three subsidiary human rights institutions: the Offices of the High             
Commissioner for Refugees, the Human Rights Council (HRC), and the Third Committee of the              
General Assembly. As a promising organ with a considerable amount of human rights             
instruments that can locate, examine, and monitor human rights crises around the world, the              
Charter limits UNGA’s function and power to making recommendations or resolutions to            
promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international          
law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in             
the economic, social, humanitarian, cultural, educational and health fields.​44 Equivalent to           
legislation, according to the UN, “resolutions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of UN                
organs;” not a law.​45 In the form of an opinion, rulings or recommendations for the action to be                  
taken, the UN Resolutions are issued by UN bodies.​46 In terms of legal force, the issuing body of                  
43 UN, “United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly,” accessed and verified on November 29, 
2020, https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml. 
44 ​ibid. 
45 UN, “UN Documentation: Overview,”October 7, 2020, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://research.un.org/en/docs/resolutions. 
46 ​ibid 
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a UN resolution determines if it is considered binding on member states.​47 ​General Assembly              
resolutions are generally considered to be non-binding.  
When it comes to maintaining international peace and security the Security Council -             
described below - is the primary organ responsible.​48 Still, the General Assembly can make              
inquiries and studies with respect to conflicts,​49 make recommendations, and also has a right to               
be kept informed by the Security Council and the Secretary-General.​50 
UN Security Council (UNSC)  
Under Article 24 of the Charter, the primary responsibility for maintaining international            
peace and security is mandated to the Security Council (UNSC).​51 What uniquely sets apart the               
UNSC from other principal organs and bodies is that, under the Charter, it has the authority and                 
power to act on behalf of all members of the United Nations; make decisions that member states                 
are then obligated to implement under the Charter; and the international jurisdiction to take              
military action against an aggressor (See ​Figure 2 for full list of UNSC’s functions and powers                
below). Meanwhile, the other organs and bodies of the United Nations can only make              
recommendations to member states.  
 




47 Emma Finamore, “Are UN Resolutions Legally Enforceable?,” AllAboutLaw, October 31, 2018, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.allaboutlaw.co.uk/commercial-awareness/commercial-insights/are-un-resolutions-legally-enforceable-. 
48 UN, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter IV: The General Assembly, Articles 13-14, accessed and verified 
on November 29, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/ga/. 
49 ​ibid. Articles 11-12. 
50 ibid. Articles 10-12.  
51 UN, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter V: The Security Council, Article 24, accessed and verified on 
November 29, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/ga/. 
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(UN, “Functions and Powers,”​ https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functions-and-powers) 
Membership​. UNSC membership was kept small so that the decision-making process           
dealing with threats to national peace and security will be more efficient. There were originally               
11 members consisting of five permanent members, the United States, Republic of China (today,              
PRC), the United Kingdom, France, and USSR (today, the Russian Federation) and six             
non-permanent members. The designation of permanent members partly had to do with the             
distribution of military power in 1945 and the desire to ensure the UN's ability to respond                
quickly and decisively to any aggression. Politically, neither the superpowers like the United             
States nor the Soviet Union would have accepted UN membership without a veto power. Now,               
as of 2020, the UNSC is composed of 15 members: ​five permanent members, and ten               
non-permanent members, who are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.​52  
52 UN, “Current Members Security Council,”, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members. 
UNSC’s Functions and Powers 
● When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before UNSC​: the UNSC has the powers to 
o Set forth principles for such an agreement; 
o Undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases; 
o Dispatch a mission; 
o Appoint special envoys; or 
o Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the               
dispute. 
● To End Disputes/Hostilities:​ the UNSC has the powers to 
o Issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict; 
o Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing             
forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought. 
● Other Enforcement Measures​: include 
o Economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans; 
o Severance of diplomatic relations; 
o Blockade; 
o Or even collective military action. 
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Functions​. Both Chapter VI of the Charter, ​Pacific Settlement of Disputes​, and Chapter             
VII, ​Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression​,                 
describes the UNSC’s role in depth.​53 Chapter VI provides a list of ways to investigate disputes                
and help parties achieve peaceful settlements. Chapter VII identifies the UNSC’s authority to             
commit all the UN members with enforcement measures such as sanctions or military force. 
Ad Hoc War Crimes ​Tribunals​. Since WWII, the UN has been involved with the              
establishment of several tribunals. The first international criminal tribunals, also known as the             
International Military Tribunals, ​were established in Nuremberg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan,           
from 1945-1948.​54 They were created by the victors of WWII, to punish individuals responsible              
for war crimes in WWII. After the Cold War era ended in 1991, with no more conflict of interest                   
between and vetoing by the United States and Russia, the very concept of punishing individuals               
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity resurfaced again because of the             
atrocities that were present in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This concept was a revival of the                
Nuremberg focus on individual responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
ICTY and ICTR. ​To bring justice for the victims and to punish individuals responsible for               
war crimes, the UNSC established two ad hoc criminal tribunals: International Criminal Tribunal             
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993;​55 and the International Criminal Tribunal for             
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.​56 During their time both ICTY and ICTR have accomplished in              
elaborating on the Geneva Conventions, setting precedents for international court procedure and            
humanitarian laws.  
53 UN, Chapter VI-Pacific Settlement of Disputes; and Chapter VII- Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, ​op. cit. 
54 Office of the Historian, “The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945–1948),” U.S. Department 
of State, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg. 
55 Security Council resolution 827, Tribunal (Former Yugoslavia) (25 May), S/RES/827 (25 May 1993), available 
from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/827. 
56 UN, “UN Documentation: International Law,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts. 
  ​Lee 36 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
The ICTY was established to prosecute serious crimes committed during the conflicts in             
the Balkans, ​taking place in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina in the 1990s, also known as,               
Yugoslav Wars.​57 The “thousands of civilians being killed and wounded, tortured and sexually             
abused in detention camps and hundreds of thousands expelled from their homes,” according to              
ICTY, distressed the international community and ultimately led the UNSC to act.​58 ICTY was              
founded in 1993 and based in the Hague, Netherlands. The ICTY was made up of three main                 
branches: the Chambers, the Registry, and the Office of the Prosecutor.  
As a tribunal, the ICTY has achieved indicting over 160 persons, including the heads of               
state, prime ministers, army chiefs-of-staff, interior ministers and mid to high-level political,            
military and police leaders from various parties to the Yugoslav conflicts.​59 Internationally, the             
ICTY achieved developing procedures for establishing the relevant facts, providing victims a            
forum in which to be heard, and fleshing out the international laws on war crimes, genocide, and                 
torture.​60 As the first tribunal of its kind, it paved the way for other future international courts                 
such as ICTR and the International Criminal Court (ICC), providing a body of jurisprudence and               
procedures. After completing its mandate in the Netherlands, the ICTY was dissolved on             
December 31, 2017. 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
A year after ICTY was established in 1993, ICTR was also created ​by UNSC to judge                
people responsible for committing genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity during            
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the Rwandan genocide in 1994.​61 Around eight-hundred thousand to one million Tutsi men,             
women and children are estimated to have been murdered during the genocide in 1994.​62 The               
UNSC decided to locate the ICTR in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. ICTR also had               
offices in Kigali, Rwanda. Its Appeals Chamber is in the Hague, Netherlands. Like ICTY, the               
ICTR is made up of three main organs: the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the                 
Registry.  
As a tribunal the ICTR has indicted 93 individuals, including high-ranking military and             
government officials, politicians, businessmen, as well as religious, militia, and media leaders,            
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda in 1994.​63            
Internationally, the ICTR has achieved becoming the first tribunal internationally to not only (1)              
“[deliver] verdicts in relation to genocide, and interpret the definition of genocide set forth in the                
1948 Geneva Conventions,” but also (2) “define rape in international criminal law and to              
recognize rape as a means of perpetrating genocide.”​64 After completing its mandate in the              
United Republic of Tanzania and also that of its appeals chamber in the Netherlands, the ICTR                
was dissolved on December 31, 2015. 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)  
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the UN’s six original principal             
organs, is the most complex and central platform for addressing and identifying solutions to              
international economic, social and environmental issues. Despite being the least visible of the             
61 UN, “Chambers,” United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal/chambers. 
62 UN, “The Genocide,” United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://unictr.irmct.org/en/genocide. 
63 UN, “The ICTR in Brief,” United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, United 
Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal. 
64 ​ibid 
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important elements in the UN structure, in fact, ECOSOC coordinates and oversees the economic              
and social activities of the UN system that make up more than 70 percent of human and financial                  
resources of the UN system.​65 ECOSOC’s wide array of works also includes encouraging             
universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
UN Secretariat 
The Secretariat, one of the principal organs of the UN, has a wide range of roles and                 
activities within the UN as an administrative body. The Secretary-General (SG) is the chief              
administrative officer and head of the Secretariat. 
The UN defines the SG as a “symbol of United Nations ideals and a spokesman for the                  
interests of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and vulnerable among them.”​66 The Charter               
lists the SG’s powers and empowers the SG to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any                  
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."​67              
According to the UN, what defines the powers of the office and grants it considerable scope for                 
action are these guidelines. The Secretary-General would fail if he did not take careful account of                
the concerns of Member States, but he must also uphold the values and moral authority of the                 
United Nations, and speak and act for peace, even at the risk, from time to time, of challenging                  
or disagreeing with those same Member States. Each Secretary-General also defines his role             
within the context of his particular time in office. 
With the Secretariat’s wide-ranging offices and departments, it coordinates and organizes           
all the work of the UN in offices and duty stations around the world and assists the work of other                    
principal bodies: UNGA, UNSC, ICJ, ECOSOC, and the defunct Trusteeship Council. Out of the              
65 Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, “The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law,” Doctors without borders, December 
2013, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/the-economic-and-social-council-of-the-un-ecosoc/. 
66 UN, “The Role of the Secretary-General,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/role-secretary-general. 
67 ​ibid 
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Secretariat’s offices and department, the entity that is in charge of human rights is the UN High                 
Commissioner for Human Rights (described below). 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
As one of the six principal UN organs established under the founding Charter, the ICJ               
also shares responsibility along with other major organs to protect and preserve the UN              
principles and interests detailed in the Charter. The ICJ’s main role is serving as an impartial                
judicial body that helps States settle legal disputes and to give advisory opinions.​68  
How the Court Works​. With the power bestowed by the UN Charter, the ICJ can only                
hear or start cases when: (1) legal disputes between States are submitted to it (​contentious cases)​;                
and (2) by referral from United Nations organs and specialized agencies requesting for advisory              
opinions on legal questions (​advisory proceedings​).​69  
Jurisdiction​. As a court, ICJ has non-compulsory jurisdiction. This means that to bring a              
case to the court, the States that are in dispute all must agree to submit a case to the court.​70                    
Basically, a member State cannot be forced to appear before the court unless it agrees to comply.                 
Only when it does agree, the ICJ’s decision holds any legal powers. For instance, in 2010,                
Australia accused Japan of breaching its obligation under the 1946 International Convention for             
the Regulation of Whaling and of other international obligations for the preservation of marine              
mammals and the marine environment, by over hunting whales.​71 Japan was found guilty in              
2014. ICJ ordered Japan to “revoke any extant authorization, permit or license to kill, take or                
treat whales in relation” to the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the               
Antarctic, as well as “to refrain from granting any further permits under Article VIII, paragraph               




71 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), 2010 I.C.J.,148 (May 31). 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/148 
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1, of the Convention, in pursuance of that program.”​72 ​A counter-example of a State refusing to                
participate is ​The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America ​in 1986. It was a case               
where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the U.S. had violated international law by                
supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the Sandinistas and by mining Nicaragua's             
harbors.​73 The US refused to participate in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument               
that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. On April 6, 1984, the US attempted a partial                  
withdrawal from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. On October 7, 1985, US President Ronald             
Regan terminated the United States acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to be effective six             
months later. The U.S. also blocked enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations Security               
Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any compensation.​74  
Human Rights​. ICJ is not a human rights court. It does not have any mechanism to                
“promote and protect” human rights. However, when human rights are framed as part of              
promoting “international peace and security,” ​the ICJ can consider a dispute that stems from              
human rights claims. For instance, in 2004, the ICJ ruled in an advisory opinion on the legal                 
consequences arising from a wall that Israel constructed in Palestinian territory under Israeli             
occupation, that Israel violated several important provisions of the 1949 Fourth Geneva            
Convention, and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International             
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as of the UN Convention on the                
Rights of the Child.​75 Voting 13-2, the judges found that all States should not "recognize the                
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall" and not give any aid or assistance in                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Fred L. Morrison, “Legal Issues in the Nicaragua Opinion,” ​American Journal of International Law​ 81, no. 1 
(January 1987): 160-166, https://doi.org/10.2307/2202146. 
74 ​ibid, 166 
75 UN, “International Court of Justice Finds Israeli Barrier in Palestinian Territory Is Illegal,” July 9, 2004,​ ​accessed 
and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/07/108912-international-court-justice-finds-israeli-barrier-palestinian-territory-ille
gal. 
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maintaining the situation.​76 Although the decision was non-binding, this advisory decision is an             
example of how ICJ can consider a dispute that stems from human rights claims and promote                
international peace and security and protect human rights. 
International Criminal Court (ICC)  
On July 17, 1998, 120 States adopted the ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal              
Court in Rome’ (“the Rome Statute”). After 60 States ratified the Rome Statute, the International               
Criminal Court (ICC) was officially established and effectively began functioning in 2002.​77            
Unlike the international tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR which had individual mandates and              
were temporary, the establishment of the ICC was an effort to create a permanent international               
criminal court that would hold wider jurisdiction and specialize on four main crimes: genocide;              
crimes against humanity; war crimes; and crime of aggression. As an IGO, the ICC is officially                
recognized as an independent permanent judicial institution. However, it still reports its activities             
to and cooperates with the UN Secretary-General, the UNGA, and UNSC. In accordance with              
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council                 
can refer certain situations to the Prosecutor of the ICC.​78 Some of the major countries that did                 
not adopt the Rome Statute are China, India, Iraq, Turkey, the United States and Myanmar.​79  
Structure and Jurisdiction. ​Unlike its predecessors — the ICTY and the ICTR — the ICC               
has four principal organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor,              
and the Registry.​80 In contrast to the ICJ, the ICC enjoys both compulsory and over individual                
jurisdictions. Basically, this means that ICC, as a court, not only has jurisdiction to pursue any                
76 ​ibid 
77 International Criminal Court (ICC), “Understanding the International Criminal Court,” pp. 1-44, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf. 
78 ​ibid. 
79 ​ibid. 
80 ICC, “About the International Criminal Court,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about. 
  ​Lee 42 
 
individuals (except those under 18 years of age) from the participating State Party, including              
heads of state and military leaders or in the territory of a State Party, but also crimes that were                   
committed in a State that has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.​81 In addition, the ICC can                 
also accept cases and jurisdiction from UNSC. Four types of crimes within the jurisdiction of the                
ICC are genocide (attacking a group of people and killing them because of race, ethnicity,               
religion), crimes against humanity (murder, enslavement, forcible transfer of population, torture),           
war crimes, and crimes of aggression.​82  
Role. ​The ICC’s main role in the international human rights regime is ​“to end impunity,               
and through international criminal justice, the Court aims to hold those responsible accountable             
for their crimes and to help prevent these crimes from happening again.”​83 ​As a complementary               
court, “ICC prosecutes cases only when the responsible state’s national courts do not and are               
unwilling or unable to do so genuinely” and fail to deal with grave atrocities.​84 Cases can also be                  
referred by the UNSC, which grants ICC jurisdiction.​85 The mandate of the Chief Prosecutor and               
the Office of Prosecutor is to independently and impartially select situations for investigation             
where atrocity crimes are or have been committed on their territories or by their nationals.                
According to ICC, there are 27 cases before the Court.​86 The main critiques of ICC are that it is                   




82 ICC, “Understanding the International Criminal Court.” ​op. cit​. pp. 13-14 
83 ICC, “About the International Criminal Court.” ​op. cit​. 
84 ICC, “How the Court Works,” International Criminal Court, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works.  
85 The ICC was able to do this previously with Darfur (Sudan) and Libya cases 
86 ​Ibid.  
87 Claire Felter, “The Role of the International Criminal Court,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign 
Relations, June 25, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court. 
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Figure 3: Human Rights in UN Organs  
88 UNHCR, “What We Do,” UNHCR, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/what-we-do.html. 
89 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Welcome to the Human Rights Council,” 
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx. 
90 OHCHR, “Human rights Treaty Bodies,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx. 
Principal Organ  Human Rights  
General Assembly ● The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR) ​88 
o Protects and assists refugees everywhere with clean water, sanitation and 
healthcare, as well as shelter, blankets, household goods and sometimes food. 
o Arranges transport and assistance packages for people who return home, and 
income-generating projects for those who resettle. 
● The Human Rights Council (HRC)​89 
o HRC addresses situations of human rights violations and makes         
recommendations on them. Its main role and ability is to discuss all thematic             
human rights issues and situations. 
o Special Procedures 
▪ Independent experts who examine, monitor, publicly report and advise on          
human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective for the HRC. 
● Third Committee of the General Assembly​ (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) 
o  Examines a range of issues, including human rights questions. 
Security Council ● Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide​ ​raises awareness of the causes and 
dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to 
advocate and mobilize for appropriate action 
● Special Advisers on the Responsibility to Protect ​leads the conceptual, political, 
institutional and operational development of the Responsibility to Protect in states. 
● UN Peacekeeping Operations 
o Many peacekeeping operations and political and peace building missions         
include human rights-related mandates to protect and promote human rights,          
such as empowering the population to assert and claim their human rights; and             
enabling State and other national institutions to implement their human rights           
obligations and uphold the rule of law. 
Secretariat ● United Nations Secretary-General address a range of human rights issues and appoint            
special representatives, who advocate against major human rights violations: 
o Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed         
Conflict 
o Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
o Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children 
● The Offices of the High Commissioner for Human Rights  (OHCHR) 
o Human Rights Treaty Bodies​: are committees of independent experts that          
monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties, such as           
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant          
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.​90 
o UN Development Group’s Human Rights Mainstreaming 
Mechanism (UNDG-HRM): ​advances human rights mainstreaming efforts 
within the UN development system.  
● Commission on the Status of Women: ​promotes gender equality and the advancement            
of women 
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(UN, “Protect Human Rights,”​ https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/) 
III. UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
The above list of principal organs and their subsidiary organs, bodies, agencies, and             
programs in Figure 3 illustrates the most up-to-date list of human rights instruments, the UN has                
developed to promote and to protect human rights over the years. Each of these instruments were                
created at various times when the UN found it to be necessary. As new instruments were being                 
developed, so were some of the older instruments abandoned as well. To diagnose the problems               
or flaws within the international human rights regime and to understand why it looks the way it                 
does today, according to Historical Institutionalism analysis, an examination of the origins of the              
91 In 2006, the Human Rights Council replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights. For more information, see 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights on p.50 of this thesis. 
92 ICJ, “The Court: International Court of Justice,”accessed and verified on March 15, 2020, 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/court. 
93 The Hague Institute for Global Justice, “The International Court of Justice's Growing Contribution to Human 






● With its other subsidiary organs ECOSOC makes policy decisions and          
recommendations to Member States, the United Nations system and other actors. 
o I.e. ​The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII)          
is an advisory body to ECOSOC and has a mandate to discuss indigenous             
issues, including human rights. 
● Commission on Human Rights (​1946-2006)​91 ​the UN’s international forum and          
mechanism mandated to promote and protect human rights 
o Examined, monitored and publicly reported on human rights situations in 
specific/mandated countries. 
o Elaborated on human rights standard 
o Drafted and established the 1948 ​Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
International 
Court of Justice 
(ICJ)​92 
● Composed of 15 judges, ICJ settles, in accordance with international law, legal disputes             
submitted to it by States and gives advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by                
authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies. 
● ICJ is not a human rights court and does not have any mechanism to “promote and                
protect” rights 
● However, according to Dr. Lyal S. Sunga from the Hague Institute of Global Justice,              
“since 2004 however, ICJ rulings seem to signal greater willingness on the part of the               
Court to apply established norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in             
disputes brought before it.”​93 
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human rights system and how institutions evolved over time is a key.​94 So from 1943 to present,                 
various critical human rights centered institutions will be discussed in chronological order.  
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (1943-47) 
It was in 1943, during WWII and and before the UN, when the first human rights                
instrument was founded – the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration           
(UNRRA). The UNRRA was created to address the large group of persecuted, homeless or              
stateless people who were displaced as a result of the ongoing WWII at the time. After the                 
agreement of 44 nations (the so-called “United Nations”), the UNRRA was founded and largely              
dominated by the United States, to “plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration              
of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United                    
Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical              
and other essential services” in 1943.​95 In short, UNRRA’s role as a human rights instrument was                
to provide emergency assistance and to promote repatriation. 
UNRRA officially became part of the United Nations in 1945. Entering the Cold War, it               
ceased operations in 1947. Today, some of the UN agencies like the International Refugee              
Organization, UNHCR, and the World Health Organization transferred and absorbed the           
UNRRA’s role. 
UN Commission on Human Rights (1946-2006) 
In 1946, the UN Economic and Social Council created its first human rights instrument to               
uphold international law and to protect fundamental rights and freedoms: the United Nations             
94 Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism," In ​Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist 
Perspective​, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, 118-38, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511801938.008. 
95 UN, “United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (1943-1946) - UNARMS,”2017, 
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-relief-and-rehabilitation-administration-unrra-1943-1946. 
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Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).​96 The UN mandated the UNCHR to “examine,            
monitor and publicly report either on human rights situations in specific countries or territories              
(known as country mechanisms or mandates) or on major phenomena of human rights violations              
worldwide (known as thematic mechanisms or mandates).”​97 Out of the ECOSOC’s nine            
commissions, it was the most active commission.​98 In the course of six decades, UNCHR              
achieved in creating the nine core international human rights treaties (See ​Figure 4 for              
breakdown of the Nine Core International Human Rights Treaties).  













96 OHCHR, “Introduction,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/chr/pages/commissiononhumanrights.aspx. 
97 ​ibid. 
98 ECOSOC’s nine commissions: Commission on the Status of Women; Commission on Sustainable 
Development(formerly, United Nations Commission on Human Rights); Commission for Social Development; 
United Nations Forum on Forests; Commission on Population and Development; Statistical Commission; 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs; Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice; Commission on Science 
and Technology for Development. 
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(UNCHR, “The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies,” 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx​) 
 
On June 16, 2006, UNCHR was officially terminated. The UN Human Rights Council 
replaced many of its tasks on March 15, 2006 (described below).  
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (1950-Present) 
After UNRRA disbanded, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for            
Refugees (UNHCR) was established by UNGA on December 14, 1950 to continue helping             
millions of Europeans who had fled or lost their homes and resumed some of the UNRRA’s                
tasks. UNHCR is governed by two principal organs, the UN General Assembly and the              
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Initially, the UNHCR was mandated to lead and             
coordinate international action to protect refugees, resolve refugee problems worldwide, and then            
99 The dates on the ‘the Date of Entry Into Force’ are when a Convention takes effect and its provisions become 
binding on ratifying States, not when the treaty/convention was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly 
Date of Entry into 
Force​99 UNCHR’s Nine Core International Human Rights Treaties 
January 4, 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
March 23, 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
January 3, 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
September 3, 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
June 26, 1987 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
September 2, 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
July 1, 2003  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families 
May 3, 2008 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
December 23, 2010 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance 
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to disband in three years.​100 However, as multiple cases of humanitarian crises kept arising, in               
2003, the organization’s mandate was extended by the General Assembly “until the refugee             
problem is solved.”​101 To this day, the UNHCR actively assists vulnerable refugees,            
asylum-seekers, internally displaced and stateless people and annually reports​102 back to the            
Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council. The UNHCR's mission is “to ensure that               
everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the                 
option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country.”​103 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (1993-Present) 
By far, the leading human rights entity in the UN is the Office of the High Commissioner                 
for Human Rights (OHCHR). In 1993, the position of High Commissioner of the OHCHR was               
established by the UNGA and entrusted with a mandate to promote and protect all human rights                
for all people. The OHCHR mainly reports to the Secretary-General and works with the Human               
Rights Council​104 as well. What the OHCHR does can be broken down to four parts: (1)                
Mainstreaming human rights; (2) Partnerships; (3) Standard-setting and monitoring; and (4)           
Implementation on the ground.​ ​105 
Mainstreaming human rights​. The OCHR is tasked with mainstreaming human rights           
within the United Nations, which means injecting a human rights perspective into all United              
Nations programs. ​At the United Nations World Summit in 2005, world leaders reaffirmed the              
100 UN, “Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy 
on Youth, September 2013, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2013/09/office-of-the-united-nations-high-commissioner-for-refugees/. 
101 ibid. 
102 UNHCR, “UNHCR Annual Reports,” 2020, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.unhcr.org/search?comid=3b4f07fd4&cid=49aea93a20&scid=49aea93a16&tags=UNHCR%20Annual%
20Reports%20General%20Assembly. 
103 UNHCR, “History of UNHCR,” 2020, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/history-of-unhcr.html. 
104 T​he UN Commission on Human Rights was officially abolished on June 16, 2006. This will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
105 OHCHR, “What We Do,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/aboutus/pages/whatwedo.aspx. 
  ​Lee 49 
 
leading role and mandate of OHCHR in responding to the broad range of human rights               
challenges facing the international community today.​106 
Partnerships. ​To fulfill its mandate of promoting and protecting human rights, according            
to UN, the OCHR works with “governments, civil society, national human rights institutions and              
other United Nations entities and international organizations, such as the International Labour            
Organization, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's             
Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International          
Criminal Court, specialized criminal tribunals, such as the ones for former Yugoslavia and for              
Rwanda, established by the Security Council, and the World Bank.”​107  
Standard-setting and monitoring. ​The OHCHR’s method of work focuses on three major            
dimensions: standard-setting, monitoring, and implementation on the ground. The OHCHR          
provides the best expertise, and substantive and secretariat support to the different United             
Nations human rights bodies as they discharge their standard-setting and monitoring duties.            
OHCHR, for example, serves as the Secretariat of the Human Rights Council. The Council,              
consisting of State representatives, is the key United Nations intergovernmental body responsible            
for human rights (and is described in more detail below). The OHCHR also supports the work of                 
special procedures, special rapporteurs, independent experts, and working groups-- appointed by           
the Council to monitor human rights in different countries or in relation to specific issues. The                
OHCHR also assists the independent experts as they carry out visits to the field, receive and                
consider direct complaints from victims of human rights violations, and appeal to governments             
on behalf of victims.  
106 ​ibid 
107 ​ibid 
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Implementation on the ground. ​The OHCHR ensures the implementation of international           
human rights standards on the ground through greater country engagement and its field             
presences. Over the years, OHCHR has also increased its presence in the field, reaching out to                
the people who need it the most. Its field offices and presences play an essential role in                 
identifying, highlighting, and developing responses to human rights challenges, in close           
collaboration with governments, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations,         
and members of civil society. Among these responses are monitoring human rights situations on              
the ground and implementing projects, such as technical training and support in the areas of               
administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights            
education, designed in cooperation with member States. 
UN Human Rights Council (2006-Present) 
On March 15, 2006, the UNGA gave birth to the UN Human Rights Council (“Human               
Rights Council”). This replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights (“UNCHR”), officially            
abolishing the UNCHR on June 16, 2006. The Human Rights Council’s members were elected              
by the majority of members of the General Assembly through direct and secret ballot.​108 
As of 2020, the Human Rights Council is made up of 47 United Nations Member               
States.​109 Assuming much of the UNCHR’s work, the Human Rights Council is responsible for              
“strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing              
situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them.”​110  
108 The General Assembly considers the candidate States' contribution to the promotion and protection of human 
rights, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments in this regard. 
109 OHCHR, “Membership of the Human Rights Council,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/membership.aspx. 
110 OHCHR, “Welcome to the Human Rights Council,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx. 
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To assess the human rights situations in all United Nations Member States, the Human              
Rights Council developed the Universal Periodic Review mechanism.​111 This mechanism allows           
the Human Rights Council and its advisory committee to focus and address thematic human              
rights issues and the complaint procedure — the process where individuals and organizations can              
bring human rights violations to the attention of the Human Rights Council. The Human Rights               
Council also works with the UN Special Procedures — made up of special rapporteurs, special               
representatives, independent experts and working groups that monitor, examine, advise and           
publicly report on thematic issues or human rights situations in specific countries. Some of the               
thematic issues the special rapporteurs report on are water and sanitation, arbitrary detention, the              
rights of migrants, violence against women, torture and human trafficking.​112 
IV. UN’S INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 
Since 1945, the UN grew more complex institutionally, and its human rights institutions             
expanded not only in size, but also their scope of work which covered more crimes and issues.                 
Earlier, I identified the following four critical junctures, moments of changes in the international              
system, when the UN experienced the most institutional changes within its evolution as right              
after WWII (1945 to 1947), during the Cold War (1947 to 1991), American Unipolarity              
(1991–2009), and Multipolar structure (2009 to the present). Some of the key causal qualities              
and/or variables that I will be tracking across the four time periods within the UN’s evolution                
are: number of new institutions created in general; number of IGOs eliminated; number of              
human rights-centered institutions created; and lastly, human rights mechanisms created, such as            
treaties and treaty bodies.  
111 ​Ibid. 
112 ​Ibid. 
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From WWII, one would think that the UN and international human rights would be better               
protected today than when it was first created in 1945. However, based on how the UN has either                  
handled and/or neglected several past humanitarian crises, I will argue that over time, it is               
actually functioning worse.  
From 1947 through 2000, there were many IGO ‘births,’ and ‘deaths.’ (See ​Figure 5 for               
breakdown of the Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs).  
Figure 5: Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs (1850 - 2000) (Next page) 
 
  ​Lee 53 
 
 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, “IGO births, deaths, and overall population growth, 1850–2005,” ​Death of 
international organizations : the organizational ecology of intergovernmental organizations, 1815–2015, ​The 
review of international organizations, 2018, OnlineFirst, p.14  
Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository, at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/60598) 
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The blue line, labeled as ‘BIRTHS,’ represents and tracks the number of IGO that was               
created at that respective time. The red line, labeled as ‘DEATHS,’ represents and tracks the               
number of IGO that was terminated at that respective time. The green line, labeled as “POPL,”                
represents and tracks the total number of IGOs that existed at that respective time. 
UN (1945 – 1947) 
Following the end of WWII and the creation of the UN, as illustrated with the blue line,                 
labeled as ‘BIRTHS,’ in Figure 5, from 1945 through 1947, the Union of International              
Associations estimated there to be around 20+ new IGO International Governmental           
Organizations (IGOs). By 1947, as illustrated with the green line, labeled as ‘POPL,’ there were               
about 80+ IGOs, inside and outside the UN, regional, and transregional. This included creation              
of some of the major IGOs, such as the UNESCO (1945), UNICEF (1946), and IMF (1944, but                 
began operation in 1947). In terms of IGO termination, from 1945 through 1947, around 10               
IGOs are estimated to have been eliminated. During this critical juncture, only two human rights               
institutions were established: the UNRRA, and the UNCHR.  
Some of the key events in the development of the UN during this critical juncture were                
the beginning of Nuremberg war trials (1945) and Tokyo International military tribunal (1946);             
US officially submitting to jurisdiction of World Court (ICJ) (1946); and lastly, signing of WWII               
peace treaties (1947). 
Cold War (1947 – 1991) 
Background 
The Cold War ensued in 1947, after the US introduced the Truman Doctrine to fight               
communism. Some of the major IGOs that either were established or went into effect during this                
critical juncture were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949); European Convention           
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on Human Rights (1953); and lastly, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)             
(1975). In this critical juncture alone, there are two major wars: the Korean War (1950 -) and the                  
Vietnam War (1954 - 1975). 
Analysis 
From 1947 to 1970, as shown in Figure 5, the number of new IGOs were increased by                 
over three-fold (270+), and around 20+ IGOs eliminated in the process. As for changes in the                
human rights-centered institutions, the UNRRA was replaced in 1947 and the UN High             
Commissioner for Refugees was established in 1950. During this period, the following five             
human rights mechanisms were both adopted and entered in force: Convention on the Prevention              
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951); Convention relating to the Status of Stateless               
Persons (1954); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1954); Supplementary           
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, Institutions and Practices Similar to              
Slavery (1957); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967); and International Convention             
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969). 
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(“Human Rights Conventions  (1947 - 1991),” ​https://treaties.un.org/​, compiled by the author) 
From 1970 to 1991, as shown in Figure 5, the number of IGOs increased by 80 (350+)                 
and around 35+ IGOs were eliminated. As for human rights-centered institutions, there were no              
major changes. During this period, the following seven human rights mechanisms were both             





















Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1951 152​113 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1954 146​114 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,          
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
1957 124​115 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967 147​116 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial          
Discrimination 
1969 182​117 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 173​118 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976 171​119 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the         
Crime of Apartheid 
1976 109​120 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against          
Women 
1981 189​121 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading         
Treatment or Punishment 
1987 171​122 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 196​123 
Convention concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent        
countries 
1991 23​124 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976); International          
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1976); Convention             
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981); Convention against             
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987); Convention            
on the Rights of the Child (1990); and lastly, Convention concerning indigenous and tribal              
peoples in independent countries (1991). 
From 1947 through 1991, there was an explosive growth of IGOs created in especially              
two periods in 1947 to 1970 and in 1970 to 1991. Collectively from 1947 to 1991, there were                  
twelve human rights conventions adopted and effective in total. Some scholars may wonder why,              
during a time of bipolar international conflict and lack of consensus, would there be so much                
growth of international institutions. As Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni—in her contribution to study           
on IGO births, deaths, and overall population growth— theorized that “states often prefer[red] to              
create new IGOs as opposed reforming existing ones” and also “that having a large and               
heterogeneous membership is associated with greater organizational survivability,”​125 I         
hypothesize that this creation of new IGOs and general growth of international institutions             
during the Cold War was most likely the states’ doing and an attempt to keep the international                 
regime alive. As to why the states would be interested in keeping the IGOs alive, I hypothesize                 
that it was most likely because having and participating in IGOs benefitted the states in               
individual ways.  
125 ​Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Death of international organizations: the organizational ecology of 
intergovernmental organizations,” 1815–2015, The review of international organizations, 2018, OnlineFirst  
Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository, at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/60598 
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American Unipolarity (1991–2009) 
Figure 7: Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs (1945 - 2017) 
 




In 1991, following the collapse of Soviet Union, according to David Andrew Tizzard, the              
world structure became unipolar and we had the rise of American Unipolarity.​126 In essence, with               
the USSR out of the way, the U.S. was the country with the “military might, cultural force, and                  
economic power” that can dominate the world.​127 Some of the major IGOs that either were               
established or went into effect during this critical juncture was the European Union (EU) in               
1993; and the African Union (AU) in 2002. In particular, this critical juncture had many wars                
126 David Andrew Tizzard, “American Unipolarity: The Uneven Distribution of Power,” ​Global Politics Review​ 3, 
no. 2 (October 2017): pp. 10-25, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331650952_American_Unipolarity_The_Uneven_Distribution_of_Power.  
127 ​ibid. p.12 
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and humanitarian crises. There were nine humanitarian crises as a result of the following seven               
wars: the Gulf War (1990-1991); Uprisings in Iraq (1991); Somali Civil War (1991-1993);             
Burundian Civil War (1995-1996); Kosovo War (1998-1999); Third Congo Civil War           
(1998-2003); Iraq War (2003 – 2011); and two ongoing wars: Afghanistan War (2001-ongoing)             
and War in Darfur (2003-ongoing). There were three major genocides as well: the Bosnian              
Genocide (1992-1995); the Rwandan Genocide (1994); and lastly, Darfur Genocide (2003 -            
ongoing).  
Figure 8: Human Rights Conventions (1991-2009)  
 
(“Human Rights Conventions  (1991 - 2009),” https://treaties.un.org/), compiled by the author. 
Analysis 
During the era of American Unipolarity, as illustrated in Figure 7, from 1991 through              












Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the             
involvement of children in armed conflict 
2002 170​128 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the             
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography 
2002 176​129 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant           
Workers and Members of their Families 
2003 55​130 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2003 190​131 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2008 182​132 
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created, in total 510+ IGOs. As for changes in human rights-centered institutions, the UN High               
Commissioners for Human Rights was established in 1993 and the UNCHR was replaced in              
2006; and human rights courts such as courts ICTY was founded in 1993; ICTR was founded in                 
1994; and ICC was founded in 1998. During this period, the following five human rights               
mechanisms were both adopted and entered in force: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the               
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2002); Optional Protocol to                
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child                 
pornography (2002); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant             
Workers and Members of their Families (2003); and lastly, Convention on the Rights of Persons               
with Disabilities (2008). 
2010 to 2020 (2010 – 2020) 
Background 
In 2009, following the decline of the US in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the                  
rise of other superpowers, such as China, according to Andrea Edoardo Varisco, the world              
structure became Multipolar.​133 Other superpowers began to challenge the U.S. For instance, in             
Asia, China began to challenge the U.S, and in Europe, Russia challenged the U.S.​134 From 2010                
to 2020, there were five humanitarian crises as a result of the following five ongoing wars                
Afghanistan War (2001-ongoing); War in Darfur (2003-ongoing); Syrian civil war (2011-);           
Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-); an Yemeni Civil War (2015-). There are three major genocides as              
well: the Genocide in South Sudan (2013-2020); and the ongoing Darfur Genocide (2003 -              
ongoing); and the Rohingya Genocide (2016 - ongoing). 
133 Andrea Edoardo Varisco, “Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,” 
E-International Relations, June 5, 2013, 
https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/. 
134 ​ibid. p.12 
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Figure 9: Human Rights Conventions (2010– 2017)  
( “Human Rights Conventions  (1991 - 2009),” https://treaties.un.org/),compiled by the author. 
Analysis 
Post-American Unipolarity, as illustrated in Figure 7, from 2010 through 2020, the Union             
of International Associations estimated there to be around 60+ new IGOs created, in total 570+               
IGOs. During this period, there were no changes in the human rights-centered institutions. Only              
one human rights mechanism was both adopted and entered in force: International Convention             
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 2010. 
V. Conclusion —Evaluation of the UN International Legal Regime’s Ability to 
Protect Human Rights  
In terms of growth and development, although the international regime and its human             
rights institutions have both expanded in both size and proportion, as illustrated in both figures 5                
and 7, it was very disproportionate. The regime itself experienced massive growth as much as               
almost six-fold from what it started with. For instance, from 1945 to 2020, it started with around                 
80+ IGOs, but by 2020, there were more than 460+ IGOs. Meanwhile, as for its human rights                 
institutions, although it was able to gain additional institutions, it also lost two of its original                
institutions. For example, in 1946, it started out with two IGOs, namely UNRRA and UNCHR.               
However, by 2020, both UNRRA (1943-47) and UNCHR (1946-2006) were both disbanded and             








International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from         
Enforced Disappearance 
2010  63​135 
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Refugees (1950-Present), UN High Commissioners for Human Rights (1993-Present), and UN           
Human Rights Council (2006-Present).  
In terms of human rights instruments, as shown in figures 6, 7, and 9, from 1945 to 2020,                  
about 18 conventions and/or treaties (“Treaties”) were created to tackle various critical human             
rights issues. But, more importantly, the number of states that signed and ratified each of these                
critical Treaties varied disproportionately during different critical junctures. Although on          
average, around 151 states signed and ratified the 18 Treaties, still some Treaties had as low as                 
23 states and as high as 196 states. In particular, the Cold War critical juncture had the most                  
fluctuations of states’ behavior in adherence as well as non-adherence, in signing and ratifying              
treaties and becoming state parties. Interestingly, except for one of Treaties​136​, there were strong              
levels of compliance, averaging around 180 states participation, during the American Unipolarity            
critical juncture.  
The UN’s abilities, capabilities, and efficiencies in addressing humanitarian crises and           
protecting human rights first show signs of inefficiency during the Cold War critical juncture.              
Although there were major increases in both the creation of IGOs and historical 12 human rights                
Treaties, the UN’s handling of and/or immobility to act in the humanitarian crises in the Korean                
War and the Vietnam War were early indicators. In between the two superpowers rivalry, the               
Korean War and the Vietnam War indicated that the UN’s ability to address humanitarian crises               
and to protect human rights was limited by design.  
Post-Cold War, there was an expectation that the UN would perform more efficiently in              
the absence of Cold War superpower rivalry. However, in contrast to the expectation, I observed               
that nothing had really changed. Furthermore, the UN's human rights institutions still didn't             
136 In 2003, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families had 55 only state signatures and ratifications. 
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protect people. Rather, in the contrary, it was during the post-Cold War critical junctures that               
exemplified the effects of what happens when the UN’s ability to address humanitarian crises              
and to protect human rights is limited. The effects of the UN’s inability were devastating. There                
were nine humanitarian crises and three genocides just from 1990 to 2006, during the American               
Unipolarity critical juncture. From 2010 to 2020, the international system’s power structure            
shifted again, and yet there were five humanitarian crises as a result of five ongoing wars and                 
three genocides, which two genocides are still ongoing. 
From my analysis above, there is enough indications and evidence to make the claim that               
the UN as an institution and its instruments are simply not enough to protect the most vulnerable                 
people and their human rights. From the Cold War to present, despite many human rights               
mechanisms and efforts made, they were simply not enough to prevent states from violating its               
people’s human rights, wars, and various humanitarian crises from taking place. As a result of               
these unresolved wars and humanitarian crises, since WWII, the number of asylum seekers,             
refugees, and the stateless people has only been increasing rapidly over time. As of 2019,               
according to the UN, there are more than 79.5 million people who are refugees, asylum seekers,                
stateless, and internally displaced people. Other common causes that commit to these numbers             
were due to religious, national, social, racial, and political persecutions, and both economic and              
climate crises. 
Upon evaluating and considering the UN’s anatomy, human rights institutions,          
instruments, as well as its performance and institutional evolution from 1945 to present, I was               
able to discover that there are multiple systemic design flaws that limited the UN’s ability to                
protect all people. There are four design flaws which I was able to discover, which deal with                 
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overarching legal concepts of ‘jurisdiction’, ‘hierarchy of the world power,’ ‘competition,’ and            
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CHAPTER 4 — DESIGN FLAWS 
I. Introduction 
In light of everything that was discussed, analyzed, and evaluated in the previous             
chapters, I theorize that the current international regime cannot keep up with our set expectations               
to truly become the system that is above the states and to protect human rights, because the UN                  
had critical baked-in flaws within its institutional design, which allowed for Westphalian            
Sovereignty and the hierarchy of world power to remain dominant. Unable to resolve these flaws               
over time, it was path dependent to fail and still operates in a neo-realist way, where states try to                   
operate according to the principle of sovereignty and competition for world power. In particular,              
the throughline in all of this is Westphalian Sovereignty. The essential nature of the international               
regime is still based on state sovereignty and consent and is inescapable. The international              
institutions are only as strong as the will of the state because the states, and especially the                 
superpowers, retain so much power. Over time, unable to subdue their power with the              
international platform, the UN never really became bigger than that.  
This Chapter will discuss the overarching legal concepts, with examples, of the following             
four design flaws that I have identified: ‘jurisdiction’, ‘hierarchy of the world power,’             
‘competition,’ and ‘slow adaptation to change’. In particular, each of these flaws are either what               
the UN lacks within its institutional design, or simply what the designers of the UN either failed                 
to or intentionally did not account for when they were constructing the framework for the UN.  
II. Design Flaw #1: Jurisdiction 
The first design flaw I was able to locate within the UN’s institutional design was the                
UN’s limited jurisdiction in states’ affairs (Design Flaw #1). Tracing the UN’s design, the              
Charter limits the UN’s jurisdiction in states’ affairs to mainly the UNSC and consent and treaty                
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based, as well. For instance, it is written in Article 2 of Chapter 1, in the Charter, that “[n]othing                   
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which               
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to               
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ...”​137 However, in the following line,               
it made an exception to the UNSC, “... but this principle shall not prejudice the application of                 
enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.”​138 It was this article of the Charter, which basically              
limited the right to intervene in states’ affairs to only the UNSC and no other organs. Given its                  
historical context of being established right after WWII, strategically limiting the jurisdiction to             
act on humanitarian crises and/or to maintain international peace and security to only the UNSC               
and giving the P-5 members permanent membership and veto power​139 may have made sense              
then. But, as analyzed in Chapter 3, from as early as the Cold War, this backfired and was a                   
terrible design flaw which was and still remains very problematic over time to today. For               
instance, a recent example of a P-5 veto that prevented humanitarian intervention was the              
ongoing Syrian War which began in 2011.​140 
Other than through the UNSC, the UN could also attain jurisdiction by either consent or               
treaty basis. Consent based jurisdiction occurs when the state which is experiencing a conflict              
can either request for help from the UN and/or grant jurisdiction to the UN, when requested. This                 
consent type of jurisdiction usually occurs when a state is being attacked or dominated              
involuntarily by another state or an armed group or a climate crisis. The failure of the United                 
Nations Operation in Somalia from 1992 through 1995 is a good example of this. Since               
Somalia's central government collapsed, the UN was not able to obtain consent for operations              
137 ​UN. “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter I: Purpose and Principles, accessed and verified on November 29, 
2020, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. 
138 ​ibid. 
139 ​The veto power of the P-5 will be discussed in detail later in this chapter 
140 ​Syrian War will be discussed in detail later in this chapter 
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from the warring parties. As a result, the UN could not deploy troops, as well as monitor the                  
cease-fire to the civil war, and there were more than 140 UN fatalities​141 from hostile acts. The                 
mission ended in March 1995, failing to fulfill the mandate. This conflict persisted until 2009.  
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 3, treaty-based jurisdiction only occurs when a               
state is a party to the convention or a treaty. When the state fails to meet its obligations arising                   
from treaties and/or violates them, it is often referred to and/or contested in the ICJ or ICC.                 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, treaty-based jurisdiction is not very reliable only because all               
states are not obligated to sign and ratify all treaties. To illustrate this, some of the human rights                  
treaties which the US has not signed and/or ratified on to are the Convention on the Rights of the                   
Child, and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. As              
Marie Wilken said, in her contribution to Global Justice Center Blog, “refusing to ratify human               
rights treaties … deprives American citizens of protections they deserve.”​142 Reiterating what            
Wilken said, when a state refuses to ratify human rights treaties, its citizens are deprived of such                 
human rights. As a result, not every state can be held liable and kept to the same standard, even if                    
they violate their citizens’ human rights. 
Especially in the cases of war and humanitarian crisis, the UN’s limited jurisdiction in              
states’ affairs becomes very problematic. Unable to intervene without the UNSC’s controversial            
discretionary approval, the UN is often held back while fully aware of atrocities and violations of                
human rights taking place throughout the world. As of 2020, some of the ongoing humanitarian               
crises are actively taking place in Afghanistan, Western Sudan (Darfur), Syria, Ukraine, Yemen,             
China, and Myanmar.  
141 ​Gloria Lotha, “UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia,” ed. Lorraine Murray, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, August 14, 2014, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/UNOSOM. 
142 ​Marie Wilken, “U.S. Aversion to International Human Rights Treaties,” Global Justice Center, June 22, 2017, 
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://globaljusticecenter.net/blog/773-u-s-aversion-to-international-human-rights-treaties. 
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III. Design Flaw #2: Hierarchy of World Power 
The second design flaw I was able to locate within the UN’s institutional design was the                
uneven membership and power among states in the UN, based on international hierarchy of              
powers, and lack of liability measure against the superpowers.  
Uneven Membership and Power  
While the UNGA’s “one state, one vote” policy may give the false impression that every               
state gets an equal say, the system never had an equal membership from the start. Tracing the                 
UN’s history from 1945, when it was first designed and built, it was already too reliant on certain                  
powerful states, especially the U.S., for help, organization, funds, and military capabilities for             
multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Realistically, the U.S.’ support in organizing           
this initiative was most likely critical and was one of the reasons why this was even possible in                  
the first place. However, this dependence allowed the U.S. to shape the UN to be developed                
more, if not only, compatible with the power and preferences of the U.S., and similar liberal                
western countries. This is also a problem of legitimacy. To be considered legitimate, the              
international regime cannot be seen as a particular dominant state’s work nor be controlled by               
the preferences of a dominant state.  
Another example of uneven membership and power exists in the permanent membership            
and power of veto within the UNSC. As discussed in Chapter 3, after WWII, based on the                 
‘power,’ measured by combined means of economic, military, technological and cultural strength            
as well as diplomatic and soft power influence, five superpowers were selected and granted              
permanent membership—China (formerly, Republic of China), France, Russia (formerly,         
USSR), the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as “P-5”). Veto power is               
an exclusive power of the five permanent members to reject any substantive resolution proposed              
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by the UNSC, and not "procedural" votes. The issue with the veto power is that, according to the                  
Security Council Report, Permanent members use the veto “to defend their national interests, to              
uphold a tenet of their foreign policy or, in some cases, to promote a single issue of particular                  
importance to a state.”​143 In essence, not only were the superpowers given a major loophole in                
which they can use to protect themselves from UNSC and any potential international liabilities              
by simply applying a veto, but also it allowed for the dominance of the principle of sovereignty                 
and hierarchy of powers to continue within the UN’s system. 
Lack of Liability Measure Against Superpowers 
Sometimes, the superpowers do what they want without facing any liability and            
consequences. In particular, this was caused by the path dependent effects of design flaws, which               
was set from origin and never fixed. The UN does not have any liability measures against                
Superpowers. Although, in response, there are cases where other superpowers issue sanctions as             
a preventive effort or to punish them, but based on many cases observed so far, it is not enough.                   
There needs to be a higher force or system above the superpowers to keep them in check and                  
balance. As of 2020, there are no such effective liability measures against superpowers.  
From 1946 to present, on multiple occasions superpowers have taken actions that clearly             
went against the established norm and rules of the UN. Yet, because of these superpower’s               
position and power, the UN cannot keep them accountable. For instance, during the Cold War, it                
was the French and the U.S. wars in Vietnam and the Soviet and Warsaw Pact’s invasion of                 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Since they were all neither granted actions by the UNSC to              
143 Security Council Report, “UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto,” December 3, 2020, accessed and 
verified on December 4, 2020, 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php. 
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maintain to restore international peace​144 nor was it done in self-defense​145​, in terms of the               
legality of these superpower’s actions, they are all violations of international law. Yet, none of               
these conflicts were brought up in the UN, nor were superpowers held liable for their actions.  
From 1947 through 1991, also known as the Cold War, the veto became especially a               
problem and, over time, was never challenged. For instance, according to Security Council             
Report, Soviet Union frequently blocked action of many peace and security issues and blocked              
Western supported new members​146 By the 1970s, the United States has used its veto more than                
any other permanent member on the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and in defense of Israel.​147             
In a more recent case, another problematic instance was the handling of the ongoing civil war in                 
Syria and the worsening humanitarian crisis that started 2011.​148 Both Russia and China             
exercised their vetoes delaying actions that could have prevented the deaths of over 500,000              
civilians and the millions displaced in Syria.​149 
Another example with a recent case was the 2014 Crimean crisis. Six years ago, the               
Crimean Peninsula, which belongs to Ukraine, was illegally annexed by Russia. Russia sought to              
justify its actions as an act of self-determination, as President Putin said, it was “to ensure proper                 
conditions for the people of Crimea to be able to freely express their will.”​150 However,               
according to Steven Pifer, it was a clear violation of “Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial              
144 ​Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter prohibits war except to maintain or to restore international peace 
(Article 42) 
145 ​Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter prohibits war except in self-defense (Article 51) 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Philip H. Gordon, Steven A. Cook, and Gayle Tzemach Lemmon. “Civil War in Syria.” ​Council on Foreign 
Relations ​, May 14, 2020, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-syria. 
149 ​Scott Lucas and Chris Doucouliagos, “How Russia's UN Vetoes Have Enabled Mass Murder in Syria,” ​The 
Conversation​, October 2, 2018, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://theconversation.com/how-russias-un-vetoes-have-enabled-mass-murder-in-syria-103565. 
150 ​Katya Kruk, “The Crimean Factor: How the European Union Reacted to Russia's Annexation of Crimea,” 
Warsaw Institute, May 7, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://warsawinstitute.org/crimean-factor-european-union-reacted-russias-annexation-crimea/. 
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integrity, and independence that Russia made in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security             
Assurances for Ukraine and 1997 Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and           
Partnership.”​151 In response, although the UNGA approved a resolution in 2014, “affirming            
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and calling the referendum that led to Russia’s annexation of its              
Crimean Peninsula illegal,” unlike in the UNSC, resolutions in the UNGA are not legally              
binding. The UNSC also can and did not do anything because Russia is a member of P-5 and it                   
can easily use its veto power to strike down any enforcement measures against them. Still, many                
countries condemned Russia for its actions, and regardless, this intervention and the illegal             
annexation continues today.  
IV. Design Flaw #3: Competition 
The third design flaw I was able to locate within the UN’s institutional design was that it                 
still operates in a neo-realist way, where states try to operate according to the principle of                
sovereignty and competition for world power. This is a baked-in flaw because over time, states               
begin to develop behaviors of prioritizing their national interests over collective international            
interests. Starting from the Cold War, to the American Unipolarity, and even now in the               
multipolar system, the P-5 members unfair power of veto and the volatility of state’s selective               
interest played and continue to play a key role in how and which humanitarian crises are                
addressed and takes priority.  
151 ​Steven Pifer, “Five Years after Crimea's Illegal Annexation, the Issue Is No Closer to Resolution,” Brookings 
Institution, March 18, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/five-years-after-crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-issue-
is-no-closer-to-resolution/. 
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Use of Veto & Trend & Superpowers. 
As the world was experiencing bipolarity, as a result of the Cold War between the two                
superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, so was the UNSC unstable. This instability within the               
UNSC reduced the UN’s ability to maintain international peace and security.  
In the history of vetoes that were used by the P-5 members, perhaps the first nineteen                
years were the worst and very one sided. From 1946 through 1965, according to the Global                
Policy Forum, 114 vetoes were applied, of which 106 came from USSR, 4 from France, 3 from                 
the UK, and 1 from China.​152 According to the Security Council report, a considerable amount of                
these USSR votes were used to block action of many peace and security issues and blocked                
Western supported new members.​153  
However, the trend changed from 1966 through 1995, when the U.S. started to apply their               
vetoes. From 1966 through 1995, the U.S. by itself applied around 80 out of 140 vetoes, while                 
the U.K. applied 29; Russia applied 15; France applied 14; and China only applied 2. It was way                  
more veto than any other member of the P-5. According to the Security Council report, it was                 
mostly used on Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and in defense of Israel.​154 After the USSR             
collapsed in 1991 and the American Unipolarity began, the Security Council’s use of Chapter              
VII, including its provisions for economic sanctions and military enforcement action, has            
increased dramatically, and most peacekeeping operations now carry Chapter VII authority. 
From 1996 through 2019, there was a different trend. Although the trend where the U.S.               
was still the member with the most amount of veto continued, some superpowers began to               
change their behaviors. For instance, France started advocating for a voluntary restraint on the              
152 ​Global Policy Forum, “Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council,” 2009, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/32810.html.  
153 ​Security Council Report, “UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto,” ​op. cit. 
154 ​Ibid.  
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veto on the part of the permanent members. In 2013, France even hosted to an event with Mexico                  
in the UNGA and called for P-5 members to “voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the                 
veto in case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale.”​155 In                
response, only the UK has supported the initiative and not others. Around 2011, Russia and               
China began to increase their use of their veto—unlike the previous years—for the conflict in               
Syria. For example, from 2011 to 2019, Russia exercised 14 vetoes​156 and China exercised 8               
vetoes​157 which delayed actions that could have prevented the deaths of over 500,000 civilians              
and the massive displacement of half of the country in Syria.​158 According to Rebecca Barber,               
the vetoed resolutions “would have demanded that parties to the conflict comply with             
international law, including by putting an end to indiscriminate aerial bombing, minimizing harm             
to civilians, and not targeting medical and humanitarian personnel,” and “renewed the mandate             
of an investigative mechanism for chemical weapons use, banned military flights in certain areas              
to prevent aerial bombing, referred crimes to the International Criminal Court, and imposed             
sanctions.”​159 The Security Council’s continued failure to agree on any meaningful action to             
protect civilians in Syria because of conflict of interests between superpowers and their             
interference via the application of veto is a perfect example of how few state's selective interests,                
in this case the superpowers’, can not only override the majority’s desires, but also decide how                
and which humanitarian crises are addressed. 
155 ​Ibid.  
156 ​Security Council Report, “UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto,” ​op cit. 
157 ​ibid. 
158 ​Scott Lucas and Chris Doucouliagos, “How Russia's UN Vetoes Have Enabled Mass Murder in Syria,”​op cit. 
159 ​Rebecca Barber, “Syria: the Disgraceful Stain Left by the UN Security Council Veto,” ​The Interpreter​, 
September 24, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/syria-disgraceful-stain-left-un-security-council-veto. 
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State’s Selective Interest 
In Chapter 2, I identified States as a Key Actor and their Role. After observing the states’                 
actions and behaviors, I realized that oftentimes they are driven by their selective national              
interests and their behaviors can be volatile. States have either attempted to join or joined               
specific UN bodies to gain a say and/or influence over world matters and international norms.               
This was apparent in the case of certain human rights bodies, such as the UNCHR and Human                 
Rights Council, and especially the UNSC. In the UN’s history of enforcement of bringing peace               
and protection of human rights, there are also cases where states’ selective interest, driven by               
either competition or for its national interests, has either delayed or prevented an action by the                
UN.  
This can be best illustrated with why the UN Commission on Human Rights (“UNCHR”)              
had to be terminated and replaced with the UN Human Rights Council (A new instrument               
established in 2006) in the first place. ​According to the UN’s December 2004 report, the               
UNCHR’s purpose was to “assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate              
how our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to make               
recommendations for strengthening the United Nations so that it can provide collective security             
for all in the twenty-first century.”​160 
Members of the Commission on Human Rights were elected by ECOSOC. The election             
elected approximately a third of the members of the Commission. The members served for             
three-year periods and were eligible to be re-elected. The 53 seats of the Commission were             
160 ​UN, 2 GA Rep 59/565, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed the 
 Secretary-General, 2 Dec 2004, para 3. 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C9B1B6D819968E83C1256F5E00597208/$file/Report+of
+the+High-level+Panel+on+Threats+Challenges+and+Change.pdf. 
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distributed as follows: 15 African States; 12 Asian States; 5 Eastern European States; 11 Latin               
American & Caribbean States; and 10 Western Europe & Other States.​161 
Previously, even before the High-level panel’s 2004 report, the UNCHR’s legitimacy was            
criticized by many UN members, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and human rights           
advocates and activists, especially how it accepted and managed its members. Specifically,            
several States, among its members, had extensive records of human rights violations — to list a                
couple, People's Republic of China, Zimbabwe, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (collectively,            
“Violators”).​162 Moreover, Libya's Chairmanship in 2003,​163 and when Sudan was elected to join             
the commission in 2004, in light of its ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region, set off a major alarm                   
for the UN and its bodies.​164  
Nazila Ghanea, Associate Professor of International Human Rights Law at the University            
of Oxford, notes that these Violators joined the UNCHR to strategically block or lessen the               
criticisms for their respective governments and atrocious human rights records.​165 In other words,             
these Violators sought membership not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves             
against criticism or to criticize others; counteractive to the work that commission was mandated              
to do. The High-level Panel confirmed and criticized the UNCHR for its membership process,              
how it became a source of international tension, and how it has left a negative impact on the                  
work of the Commission.​166  
161 UN. “Membership.” OHCHR. Accessed May 2020. 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/Membership.aspx. 
162 Nazila Ghanea, "From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council: One Step Forwards or 
Two Steps Sideways?" ​The International and Comparative Law Quarterly​ 55, no. 3 (2006): 699. Accessed March 
16, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/4092647. 
163 ​Ghanea, op. cit.,​ ​p.699. 
164 International Federation of Human Rights. “Sudan Elected to the UN Human Rights Commission While Grave 
Violations Still Perpetrated.” International Federation for Human Rights, July 5, 2004. 
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/sudan/Sudan-elected-to-the-UN-Human. 
165 Ghanea, op. cit., p.699 
166 ​2 GA Rep 59/565, op. cit., paragraph 285 
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By the same token, with corrupted membership, UNCHR commonly provoked backlash           
for its selectivity addressing the human rights concerns. For example, despite the United States’              
effort in addressing Sudan’s ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region on April 2004,​167 Sudan’s              
membership to the commission was uncontested in May 2004. With the commission’s            
unwillingness and failure to do anything, Sudan’s ethnic cleansing was instead addressed by the              
United Nations Security Council on July 30, 2004,​168 see UNSCR ​Res 1556.​169 Highlighting the              
selectivity issue, Professor Ghanea notes that by utilizing political favor the Violators make sure              
that any resolution would be less condemnatory in tone, making sure it was adopted through a                
vote and not by consensus, or even by misusing the 'no-action motion' to block discussion of                
their human rights situation.​170 In other words, Violators would use their seat to dilute any human                
rights resolution against themselves and evade the commission’s mandate to promote, protect,            
and advance human rights. 
V. Design Flaw #4: Slow Adaptation to Change 
The fourth design flaw is a collective set of design flaws all themed under the concept of                 
‘slow adaptation to change.’ Throughout time, there are patterns of established countries            
breaking up and new countries being founded, as well as countries changing their forms of               
governance (Monarchy, Communist, Republic, Military Dictatorship, etc). As a result, state laws            
and policies change. Sometimes they do not comply with established understanding, rules, and             
ideologies, especially, when it comes to international laws, UN efforts, and human rights.             
167 ​U.S. Department of State. “Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur.” U.S. Department of State, April 27, 2004. 
https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/31822.htm. 
168 ​Sudan was ordered to lift restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to co-operate with an 
independent investigation into human rights violations, and to resume dialogue with dissident groups in Darfur. 
Furthermore, arms embargo was imposed on various groups in Sudan, until Sudan complied with the Security 
Council’s order. 
169 ​UNSCR. Res 1556, pp.1-5. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1556 
170 ​Ghanea, op. cit., p.697 
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Thereby, sometimes there are cases of minorities being excluded, deprived of human rights, and              
suffering. Documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and such conventions            
calling for protection of human rights are currently not enough to protect these most vulnerable               
people and their human rights. In terms of institutional design, this design flaw highlights how               
the UN lacks in measurement against these critical and problematic changes that happen within              
or to the state, such as when there are cases of breakdown and emergence of new States; or when                   
a state’s form of government changes; and/or when a state creates a new inclusion or exclusion                
policy. 
Breakdown and Emergence of New States.  
Breakdown and emergence of new states occurs for various reasons. From 1945 to             
present, there were multiple cases of states splitting. For example, to list a couple, in 1945, North                 
and South Koreas were created after Japan surrendered to the Allies; in 1947, India and Pakistan                
was created as a result of Partition of India; in 1971, Bangladesh emerged out of Pakistan as a                  
result of Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; and in 1993, Czechoslovakia split into Czech Republic and               
Slovakia as a result of self-determined split.  
Although there are cases of self-determined splits like Czechoslovakia in 1993, the            
effects of breakdown and emergence of new states are often catastrophic. Oftentimes, many             
people end up displaced and/or become refugees and stateless because residents cannot secure             
citizenship under the restrictive and sometimes discriminatory laws of the new states, or if the               
successor states lack the administrative capacity to register their residents or do not afford them               
sufficient time to register. For instance, according to Sajal Nag, the partition of India created 15                
million refugees and five million Koreans were displaced as a result of the Korean war.​171  
171 ​Sajal Nag, "Nationhood and Displacement in Indian Subcontinent," ​Economic and Political Weekly​ 36, no. 51 
(2001): 4753-760, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411510. 
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Currently, the UN does not have any effective measure to deal with breakdown and              
emergence of new states nor effective jurisdiction to intervene. As a result, many are excluded,               
deprived of human rights, and suffering.  
Figure 10: Forms of Government, 2018  
 
 




Changes in Form of Government 
According to Figure 10, as of 2018, the types of government around the world can be                
categorized with the following eight types: Absolute Monarchy, Communist, Constitutional          
Monarchy, Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy, Parliamentary Republic, Presidential       
Republic, Semi-Presidential Republic, and No Functioning Central Government. Throughout         
history, many countries have changed their forms of government. As discussed in Chapter 2, the               
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form of government plays a critical role when determining how the country is ruled and human                
rights are either protected or limited. 
Currently, the UN does not have any effective measure to deal with changes in form of                
Government nor effective jurisdiction to intervene when it occurs. As a result, many are              
excluded, deprived of human rights, and suffering. 
New Inclusion vs. Exclusion Policies 
As discussed in Chapter 2, although it varies state by state, citizenship or having a               
nationality usually plays a critical role in determining a person’s level of protected human rights.               
Meanwhile, again it varies state by state, when a person does not have a nationality or are                 
‘stateless,’ their human rights are usually not guaranteed and to some extent non-existent. So, in               
this context, states and their policies are very important because they are the primary actors who                
have the power to create policies and laws that are either inclusive or exclusive. Inclusive               
policies are not the problem, it is the exclusion policies which are the main problem. Exclusion                
policies can take multiple forms, such as persecutions and removal of rights based on religion,               
social, racial, national and/or political factors, and as far as, revoking nationality. 
Currently, Rohingyas in and out of Myanmar, Muslims in India, and Uighurs in China are               
experiencing such exclusionary policies. The UN does not have any effective measure to protect              
these vulnerable people. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the following four Design Flaws: ‘jurisdiction’, ‘hierarchy of             
the world power,’ ‘competition,’ and ‘change;’ and how each of these flaws allowed for the               
Westphalian Sovereignty and hierarchy of world power to co-exist. I also discussed how these              
Design Flaws were left unresolved over time and consequently, the UN was path dependent to               
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fail from the beginning. In the following Chapter, the ongoing Rohingya Muslim Crisis will be               
analyzed as a case study and the following topics will be covered: How Rohingyas became               
stateless; crises in 1991, 2012, and 2016; 2017 Genocide; post genocide crisis management;             
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CHAPTER 5 – CASE STUDY: ROHINGYA​ ​MUSLIMS​ ​CRISIS​ 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I am going to first delve into the UN’s procedures of maintaining               
international peace and security and protecting and promoting human rights, and explore the             
Rohingya Muslim Crisis, and the 2017 Genocide, to closely study why the UN wasn’t there to                
protect these stateless peoples’ human rights, and to stop the genocide from taking place. Upon               
examining all of the UN's human rights mechanisms and institutions, the only one that has the                
independent enforcement authority is the Security Council (“UNSC”). I have found this to be the               
case because in the history of the UN, from its origin to present, by design, the Charter only                  
authorized the UNSC with the jurisdiction, authority, and power to intervene in state’s domestic              
affairs; and no other IGOs within the UN. To this date (2020), only the UNSC has such                 
jurisdiction, authority, and power. Therefore, in this case study, to address this thesis’             
puzzle—Why the UN could not protect the Rohingya’s human rights — the UNSC and its               
actions will be closely observed and traced.  
In response to interstate and intrastate humanitarian conflicts and crises that threaten            
international peace and security, according to the UNSC, the standard tactics and tools it has               
been employing for years are: using preventive diplomacy and mediation, imposing sanctions,            
sending peacekeeping forces, assisting with peacebuilding, countering terrorism, and         
encouraging disarmament.​172 Among them, as political scientist and peace researcher Ramesh           
Thakur writes, “one of the most visible symbols of the UN role in international peace and                
security” is the peacekeeping operation.​173 In fact, in multiple cases from as early as 1956,               
peacekeeping operations have shown to be effective in containing fights or stabilizing a             
172 UN, “Maintain International Peace and Security,” ​op cit. 
173 Ramesh Thakur, ​The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the  
Responsibility to Protect​, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, doi:10.1017/9781316819104. 
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cease-fire until negotiations produced lasting peace agreements in interstate conflicts. In 1988,            
the UN was even awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize for its successful peacekeeping activities.               
This has led to expansion of tasks for peacekeepers and many new missions involving complex               
intrastate conflicts and multidimensional peacekeeping— “operations comprising a mix of          
military, police, and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable              
peace.”​174 Today, the UN’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations are not only used to            
maintain peace and security, but also “to facilitate political processes, protect civilians, assist in              
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support constitutional          
processes and the organization of elections, ​protect and promote human rights​175 and assist in              
restoring the rule of law and extending legitimate state authority,” according to the UN.​176  
In the post-Cold War era, UN peacekeeping operations have been and still are crucial,              
especially in protecting and promoting human rights, in the following humanitarian crises: Iraq             
War (1991); Bosnian War and Genocide (1992-1995); Somali Civil War (1992-1993); Rwandan            
Genocide (1994); Crisis in Burundi (1995-1996); ongoing Crisis in the Democratic Republic of             
the Congo (DRC) (1998-Present); Kosovo War and Ethnic Cleansing (1999); ongoing Darfur            
Genocide (2003-Present); and ongoing Syrian Civil War and Crisis (2011-present). As of 2020,             
there are 13 UN peacekeeping operations currently deployed and there have been a total of 58                
past operations since 1956.​177 Protecting the Rohingya would have been consistent with these             
previous actions and within UNSC jurisdiction. So, why, then, did the UNSC not act? 
174 ​UN, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (‘the Capstone Doctrine’),” 2008, 
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-principles-and-guidelines-the
-capstone-doctrine/. 
175 ​Emphasis was “mine.” 
176 United Nations, “Maintain International Peace and Security,” 2020, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/maintain-international-peace-and-security/index.html.  
177 ​UN Peacekeeping, “Current Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping,” United Nations Peacekeeping (United 
Nations Peacekeeping, 2020), https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/current-peacekeeping-operations. 
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Still, much of the UN’s involvement in other states’ affairs and the peacekeeping             
operations’ major development and expansion of tasks to include protection and promotion of             
human rights are under Security Council’s discretion and its power to determine which             
humanitarian crises would qualify as threats to international peace and security under Chapter             
VII. In simpler terms, which crises gets the UN’s attention and/or intervention depends on the               
political will in the Security Council, and even more precisely on the interest of the ​P-5                
superpowers. This was evident during the Cold War, where many important issues of peace and               
security, such as the Vietnam conflict​178​, either never made it on the UN agenda or addressed                
because of the threat of veto power.​179 This chapter also asks if this was also the case for the                   
Rohingyas crisis and Genocide. 
History tells us the Rohingyas sought help and international protection from their            
persecutor, the government of Myanmar, on numerous occasions as early as 1991. Fast             
forwarding to 2017, when acts of genocide and crimes against humanity were committed, why              
didn’t the UN, or more specifically the Security Council, take any action to prevent further               
damage? I will argue that the UN did not take any action because of the path dependent effects of                   
the following institutional Design Flaws: Slow Adaptation to Change; Hierarchy of World            
Power; Competition; and Jurisdiction. This chapter demonstrates this with the following six            
sections. The first section explains how the Rohingya people became stateless and their life after               
becoming stateless. The second section provides the history and key moments of the Rohingya              
Muslim Crisis, as well as, traces what the UNSC did from 1990 to present. The third section                 
178 To clarify, according to Lobel, although the Vietnam conflict was on UNSC’s agenda, after the U.S.’ insisted, 
“no action has ever been taken by the Security Council to restore peace in Vietnam.” See more at William N. Lobel, 
“The Legality of the United States' Involvement in Vietnam - A Pragmatic Approach,” ​University of Miami Law 
Review​ 74, no. 4 (1969): 792-813, https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol23/iss4/7 
179 In the case of the Vietnam conflict, an argument can be that the UNSC failed to act because the U.S., a 
veto-power holder, was involved. To clarify, a claim can be made that the UNSC was immobile because the 
possibility of the U.S. easily blocking any of the UNSC’s potential action with a veto was there.  
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explains the 2017 Genocide and covers post-genocide crisis management from 2017 to 2020.             
Next, the fourth section examines two ​critical junctures ​-- moments in history when the UNSC               
had the chance to intervene, but did not because of the Design Flaws: Time 1, the moment when                  
Burma’s regime changed to military rule in 1962, set Myanmar on a limited path to Time 2, the                  
moment when Myanmar’s military regime appeared to change to one led by the civilian National               
League for Democracy political party in 2015, though with limited choices for the NLD. Lastly,               
the last section concludes the chapter. 
II. Becoming Stateless & Life After 
The Rohingyas were not always stateless. Up until 1974, the Republic of Burma             
recognized the Rohingyas as Burmese citizens. In 1948, Burma became independent from the             
British in January, and joined the United Nations in April. In the following year, the new                
Parliament passed the Union Citizenship Act in 1948, which recognized all citizens as equal,              
including the Rohingya and other minority groups. Post-independence, in 1949, Burma created            
its first form of national identification and it was also issued to Rohingyas.​180 From 1951 through                
1960, Burma held three general elections. All citizens had the right to vote, including the               
Rohingya. Voters even elected several Rohingyas as members of Parliament.  
1962 Military Coup & Rule 
In 1962, the Burmese military, led by General Ne Win, staged a coup with armed forces                
overthrowing the elected government and establishing military rule without any blood. Given            
that more than 40% of people living in Myanmar​181 were made up by different minority               
180 ​United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma's Path to Genocide Timeline,” 2020, accessed and verified 
on November 29, 2020, https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/timeline.  
181 ​BBC News, “Who Are Burma's Minority Groups?,” November 18, 2010, accessed and verified on November 29, 
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11620652. 
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groups,​182 and the military was primarily led and made up by Burmese descendants, who make               
up the other 60% of Myanmar’s population, among many possible reasons why the military              
staged a coup, I theorize that the pre-existing ethnic conflict​183 and Burmese national identity              
played a big role. In particular, this theory becomes more apparent as the military regime               
legitimizes itself and crafts new strategic restrictive measures in a pattern of every 4 years               
between 1974 and 1982.  
Shortly after, in 1974, to legitimize its position and power, and to create a more military-                 
favored system, Burma’s military-run government enacted a new constitution, which established           
one-party rule, overrun with military members. After legitimizing its power and taking full             
control of the government, in the same year, the military’s Parliament passed the Emergency              
Immigration Act. In effect, this law limited the rights of individuals the military saw as               
“foreigners” from Bangladesh, China, and India, including the Rohingya. Burmese authorities           
begin confiscating Rohingyas’ national registration cards.  
In 1978, Burmese authorities launched Operation Naga-Min, or “Dragon King,” to           
register and verify the status of citizens and people viewed as “foreigners.” Soldiers assaulted              
and terrorized Rohingya. Four years after, in 1982, the Parliament passed a new law, which               
based citizenship on ethnicity. The new law excluded the Rohingya and other minority             
communities and stripped their Burmese citizenship, which rendered them stateless. In 1989,            
Burma changed its name to Myanmar and the government required everyone to apply for new               
identification cards, called Citizenship Scrutiny Cards. Rohingya never received the new cards.  
 
182 ​Myanmar's list of minority groups are composed of Rakhine, Karen, Mon, Shan, Muslim Rohingya, Wa, Chin, 
Kachin, and Karenni people. 
183 ​Based on Myanmar's history, the internal ethnic conflict between the Burmese descendants and other minorities 
can be traced as far as when it was colonized by the U.K. in both the 19th and 20th centuries.  
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Figure 11: Chronology 1990 - 2005  
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17 May 2004  
 
17 February 2005 
The NLD won in the first multiparty election since a military coup toppled the government in 
1962. The military refuses to recognize the results and remains in power. 
 
Military launched Operation Pyi Thaya (Clean and Beautiful Nation) during which soldiers 
committed widespread violence. Roughly 250,000 Rohingya flee to Bangladesh. 
The General Assembly passed resolution 46/132, deploring the fact that the Government of 
Myanmar had not fulfilled commitments to taking steps toward the establishment of a 
democracy and expressed concern at the seriousness of the human rights situation in the 
country. 
The Commission on Human Rights, in resolution 1992/58, established a Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Yozo Yokota of Japan was named to the post. 
 
The government started a national constitutional convention. 
NLD members walked out of the national constitutional convention because of restrictions on 
debate. 
 
Suu Kyi released from house arrest. 
 
Rajsoomer Lallah of Mauritius became the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
situation in Myanmar, succeeding Yozo Yokota. 
 
A national constitution convention closed without drafting a new constitution. 
 
The Secretary-General appointed Alvaro de Soto of Peru as his Special Envoy to Myanmar. 
The ruling party, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), changed name to the 
State Peace and Development Council  (SPDC) 
 
The Secretary-General appointed Razali Ismail of Malaysia as his Special Envoy for Myanmar, 
replacing Alvaro de Soto. 
Suu Kyi and a convoy of NLD members faced off with police. UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan called on the government to engage in political dialogue with the NLD. 
 
Suu Kyi was again placed under house arrest. 
 
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro of Brazil became the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in 
Myanmar, succeeding Rajsoomer Lallah. 
 
Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. 
 
Suu Kyi and a convoy of supporters were attacked by a militia outside Mandalay. Suu Kyi was 
arrested shortly after. 
 
The ruling party, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), announced the road map 
to democracy. Gen. Khin Nyunt succeeded Than Shwe as prime minister. Shwe remained head 
of the SPCD. 
 
National constitutional convention reconvened. 
 
The National Convention reconvened, without the involvement of the NLD. 
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Source: Historical Chronology: Update Report No. 4: Myanmar (2005). Accessed and verified November 11, 2020. 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1304015.php 
III. Rohingya Muslim Crisis (1990 - Present) 
1990 The National League For Democracy & Military 
In 1990, with Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Gen. Aung San, as the party’s leader,                 
the National League for Democracy (NLD) Party won Burma's national elections. However, the             
military refused to recognize the results and remained in power. This stirred political unrest              
throughout Burma.  
1st Rohingya Muslim Crisis (1991) 
In 1991, as citizens continued to call for democratic reforms, Myanmar’s military            
launched a new campaign against the Rohingya to create a political diversion— Operation Pyi              
Thaya or “Clean and Beautiful Nation.” Burmese soldiers turned to Rohingyas and violently             
executed, raped, and assaulted them. They also destroyed their homes and property and even              
subjected them with forced labor, and religious persecution.  
Between 1991 and 1992, more than 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.​184 With the             
assistance of UNHCR and non-governmental relief agencies, according to the Human Rights            
Watch report, “the Bangladeshi government sheltered the refugees in nineteen camps in the             
vicinity of Cox's Bazar in southeastern Bangladesh.”​185 In December 17 1991, The General             
Assembly passed resolution 46/132, deploring the fact that the Government of Myanmar had not              
184 ​Security Council Report, “Chronology of Events: Myanmar,” October 6, 2020, accessed and verified on 
November 29, 2020. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/myanmar.php. 
185 Human Rights Watch, “Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution,” May 2000, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm. 
 
June 2005  
 
6 July 2005  
 
3 December 2005 
 
The US raised concerns about Myanmar at the Security Council’s closed consultations under 
“other matters.” 
The Government of Myanmar released 249 political prisoners. 
 
The Security Council decided to hold a closed-door briefing on the situation in Myanmar. 
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fulfilled commitments to taking steps toward the establishment of a democracy and expressed             
concern at the seriousness of the human rights situation in the country.​186 Neither able to               
integrate the Rohingyas nor to keep hosting them, the Bangladeshi government intended to send              
all the refugees home quickly and sought to achieve this through negotiation with the ruling State                
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in Rangoon.​187 By 1992, roughly 150,000            
Rohingya in Bangladesh repatriated back to Burma whether they wanted to or not.​188 In January               
1993, the Myanmar government started a national constitutional convention. In 1994, the            
government started to deny Rohingya children birth certificates. In the following year, 1995, the              
government issued Rohingya a new form of identification, known as a temporary registration             
card or “white card.” However, it does not serve as proof of citizenship. In 1995, National                
League for Democracy members walked out of the national constitutional convention because of             
restrictions on debate.  
In June 2005, the US, one of the superpowers, took an interest and raised concerns about                
Myanmar at the Security Council’s closed consultations under “other matters,” on the grounds             
that the situation there, with its refugee flows and drug trade, constituted a threat to international                
peace and security.​189 On September 20, Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu commissioned a             
Report finding that Burma fit the criteria for United Nations Security Council (UNSC)             
intervention. The Report called on UNSC members to pass a resolution requiring the regime to               
work with the UN in restoring democracy to Burma, and to release Aung San Suu Kyi and all                  
prisoners of conscience. Shortly after, by the beginning of December 2005, ten members of the               
186 Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,” October 6, 2020, accessed and verified on 
November 29, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/myanmar.php. This paragraph and all 
figures are drawn from this source. 
187 ​Human Rights Watch, “Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution,” ​op. cit. 
188 ​Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,”​op. cit. 
189 ​Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,”​op. cit. 
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Council were willing to place Myanmar on the agenda of the Council. However, Algeria, Brazil,               
China, Japan and Russia were opposed. So, on December 3, 2005, in informal consultations, a               
decision was made by consensus that the Council would receive a briefing on Myanmar from a                
senior Secretariat official under “other matters” item during informal consultations. The           
alternative was a formal meeting which would have resulted in a vote to approve an agenda item.                 
With ten votes in favour and no veto on procedural issues, the decision would have been positive                 
but at the same time, it would have shown the split in the Council. Acting by consensus at this                   
stage and time was perhaps thought to have greater impact. On December 16, 2005, the Security                
Council held its first ever briefing on the situation in Myanmar, the UNSC had it in its authority                  
to intervene, but it didn't. 
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On 29 September and 27 November the Council was briefed on Myanmar by 
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari who covered the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Myanmar, the human rights and refugee problem in the Karen state 
and progress towards an inclusive and democratic political process. 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross publicly censured Myanmar’s government 
accusing it of committing serious abuses against detainees and civilians. 
 
The government had completed the first stage of its “roadmap to democracy” producing 
guidelines for a new constitution. Observers noted that a constitution based on these guidelines 
would legitimise military rule. On 26 September, the Security Council held an emergency 
meeting and it supported the Secretary-General’s decision to send the Special Adviser to the 
region. 
 
On 11 October, the Council adopted its first presidential statement on Myanmar deploring the 
use of violence against demonstrations and emphasising the importance of early release of 
prisoners. 
 
The Special Adviser briefed the Council on 13 November regarding his mission to Myanmar 
and in response, the Council issued a press statement which deplored “that many prisoners are 
still in jail and new arrests have occurred”; stressed the need for the Myanmar government “to 
create conditions for dialogue and reconciliation by relaxing as a first step, the conditions of 
detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and release of political prisoners and detainees”; and 
confirmed that the Council would “keep developments in Myanmar under close review.” 
 
On 7 May, France asked the Council to consider using ​“responsibility to protect”​ as the basis 
for Council action to get aid into Myanmar. ​This proposal was met with considerable 
resistance​ by China, Indonesia, and South Africa.​190 
 
As political unrest under the military government has been getting worse, the Special Envoy 
on Myanmar made reports and briefed the Council on his visits to Myanmar regarding military 
government’s unlawful arrests, political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.  
 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Myanmar and met with senior officials but his request 
to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi was denied. ASEAN reiterated its call on the Myanmar 
government to immediately release all those under detention including Aung San Suu Kyi so 
that they can participate in the 2010 elections. 
 
On 11 August the Council held consultations to discuss the situation in Myanmar and the 
implications of Aung San Suu Kyi being sentenced to a further 18 months of house arrest.On 
13 August the Council issued a press statement reiterating the importance of the release of all 
political prisoners. In that context the Council expressed serious concern at the conviction and 
sentencing of Aung San Suu Kyi.  
 
In March, November, and December, the Council members were briefed by the Special 
Advisor on the situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, and the publication of the five new 
electoral laws. The military-backed political party wins Burma’s first national elections held 
since 1968. It appoints General Thein Sein as president. The opposition party, National League 
for Democracy, boycotts. 
 
Burma holds local elections in some areas. Council members were briefed in informal 
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2nd Rohingya Muslim Crisis (2012) 
Domestically, as Myanmar citizens grew discontented with the military’s rule, political           
unrest increased in 2006. To suppress and exert control over its civilians, the Myanmar              
government unlawfully detained and imprisoned anyone who dared to oppose the military.            
Internationally, more than the deteriorating humanitarian crisis and the refugee problem           
involving the Rohingyas, the Security Council was more interested in Myanmar’s political            
prisoners, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, and the non-existent democratic political process under the               
military rule from 2000 through 2012. 
In 2012, between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine State there were             
clashes, which immediately erupted into state-supported violence against the Rohingya. Shortly           
after, some Buddhist citizens and monks established “The 969,” a Buddhist nationalist            
movement, which included using anti-Rohingya hate speech that claimed Rohingyas do not            
belong in Myanmar, are a threat, and intruders.​191 This movement was later banned, as this               
movement encouraged more unwanted violence against Muslims in the country. With the            
escalating state supported persecution, from 2012 through 2014, tens of thousands of Rohingya             
fled Burma by boat.​192 
191 ​United States Holocaust Memorial Museum​ op. cit. 





consultations by the Special Adviser that Aung San Suu Kyi’s area elected her as their member 
of Parliament. 
 
Clashes between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine State erupt into 
state-supported violence against the Rohingya. ​On June 20, the Council members were 
updated on the recent troubles in the western Rakhine State, where the communal violence 
between the ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims has led to a humanitarian crisis. 
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On 16 April, Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for Myanmar, briefed 
Council members in consultations and updated Council members on the situation on the ground 
in Myanmar.  
 
Under “any other business” in informal consultations, at the request of the UK on 17 April, the 
briefing focused on the situation in Rakhine, in particular the recent rise in inter-communal 
tensions there, the disruption of humanitarian aid and the controversy surrounding the national 
census that was conducted for the first time in 30 years without Rohingya. 
 
The government invalidated Rohingya white cards, their only form of identification. Then, the 
Rohingyas are required to obtain national verification cards. These cards incorrectly identify 
Rohingya as immigrants from Bangladesh. Most Rohingyas reject the new cards. 
 
On 2 April,  the Special Adviser on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar acknowledged recent positive 
developments such as continuing progress in the reform process and the 31 March nationwide 
ceasefire between ethnic armed groups and the government, but also noted continuing challenges 
in Rakhine state, increasing violence in Kachin and Northern Shan states and concerns about the 
human rights situation.  
 
On 28 May, the High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein briefed Council 
members on the human rights situation in Myanmar, in particular on the Rohingya and the related 
migration crisis in Southeast Asia. 
 
On 28 August, Special Adviser Vijay Nambiar an update was provided on progress towards 
signing a national ceasefire agreement, as well as the situation with regard to minority groups in 
Rakhine State, and preparations for elections later this year. 
 
On 19 November, the Special Advisor Vijay Nambiar briefed Council members on the 8 
November elections in which the National League for Democracy, the party of Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Aung San Suu Kyi, won by a landslide. Nambiar welcomed the peaceful and orderly 
conduct of the elections but noted as a serious flaw the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya. 
 
On 4 February, the UK sent a letter to the Council president requesting the retention of the 
situation in Myanmar on the list of items of which the Council is seized. On 25 February, the 
Special Adviser Vijay Nambiar briefed Council members on the political transition, the peace 
process and the human rights situation.  
 
Aung San Suu Kyi becomes State Counsellor, a new role created with authority over the 
president. She is now the de facto head of the Burmese government. The NLD party takes control 
of parliament. 
 
The Myanmar government appointed an Advisory Commission, led by former United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, to look at the situation between Buddhists and the Rohingya in 
Rakhine State. The following year (2017), the commission made 88 recommendations to improve 
the situation. 
 
A small group of Rohingya men attack several  Myanmar police posts in Rakhine State, and nine 
officers are killed. In response, the Myanmar military launches a “clearance operation,” killing 
people, raping women, and destroying Rohingya villages throughout northern Rakhine. The 
violence forces roughly 86,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.  
 
On 17 November, the Special Adviser Vijay Nambiar briefed Council members on the recent 
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After the June 2012 meeting, the Rohingya Muslim Crisis issue appeared even less on the               
Security Council’s agenda. The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for Myanmar, Vijay          
Nambiar made visits to Myanmar several times and updated Council members on the situation              
on the ground in Myanmar, in informal consultations under “any other business” once a year.               
Other than the annual informal debrief meetings, which was done so at the request of the UK, the                  
Security Council took no particular action to address the humanitarian crises and the Rohingya              
refugee crisis in Myanmar from April 2013 through April 2015. In terms of reasons why the                
UNSC took no particular action, one plausible reason why may be because this was when the                
UN Syrian refugee crisis was being addressed by the UN and major superpowers like Russia and                
China generally opposed any intervention in domestic affairs.  
However, starting in April 2015 the Security Council, more specifically the United            
Kingdom, took greater interest in the Rohingya Muslim Crisis. Although the meetings were still              
being held in informal consultations under “any other business,” the Security Council convened             
more frequently from 2015 through 2016.  
End of Military Rule - Beacon of Hope? 
In November 2015, Myanmar held national elections. Although the Rohingya did not            







escalation of violence in Rakhine state and the humanitarian and human rights situation. While 
emphasizing that lack of access made it difficult to assess the situation, Nambiar said there were 
signs of more organized resistance by the Rohingya and a risk of further radicalization of the 
conflict. 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact Finding 
Mission to investigate human rights abuses in  Myanmar. The  Myanmar government refuses to 
cooperate. On 17 March, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed 
Council members on the situation in Myanmar. The main focus of the briefing was the situation 
in Rakhine, including the humanitarian challenges. Security Council Members expressed 
concerns about human rights violations and the humanitarian situation and were interested in how 
the UN could support the peace process. 
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Aung San Suu Kyi won in a landslide. Shortly after, in April 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi became                  
State Counsellor, a new role created with authority over the president. As the NLD party took                
control of parliament and Suu Kyi became the de facto head of the Burmese government, there                
was a regime change from the military rule to NLD party’s rule. In many respects, the end of                  
military rule and a new government led by Suu Kyi was viewed as an ideal outcome and a                  
beacon of hope domestically and internationally. Many believed in its potentials and possibilities             
to change its current corrupt existing system. Still, it was plagued by the 2008 constitution,               
which was designed to support and justify military rule. The constitution left the power to               
command much of the government to the military, which made immediate reforms to their              
political system unrealistic.​193  
In September 2016, the new NLD-led Myanmar government appointed an Advisory           
Commission, led by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, to look at the              
situation between Buddhists and the Rohingya in Rakhine State. The following year (2017), the              
commission made 88 recommendations to improve the situation. 
3rd Rohingya Muslim Crisis (2016) 
In October 2016, a small group of Rohingya men, later known as ARSA, attacked several               
Burmese police posts using household knives, stones, and home-made explosives in Rakhine            
State. Nine officers were killed as a result.​194 The military retaliated with another widespread              
campaign of violence of killing people, raping women, and destroying Rohingya villages            
throughout northern Rakhine. Tens of thousands more Rohingya fled to neighboring countries            
193 Andrew R.C. Marshall and Timothy Mclaughlin, “Myanmar's Suu Kyi Says [She] Will Be above [The] President 
in New Government,” Thomson Reuters, November 5, 2015, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-election/myanmars-suu-kyi-says-will-be-above-president-in-new-gove
rnment-idUSKCN0SU0AR20151105. 
194  ​Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,”​op. cit. 
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for safety.​195 Roughly 86,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.​196 Security forces increased           
restrictions again on those who stayed.  
On November 17, 2016, under “any other business,” at the request of the US, the               
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, briefed Council members on           
the recent escalation of violence in Rakhine state and the humanitarian and human rights              
situation. According to the Security Council report, during the meeting, Nambiar said “there             
were signs of more organised resistance by the Rohingya and a risk of further radicalisation of                
the conflict.”​197 Still, the Security Council took no particular action to address the humanitarian              
crises and the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar. 
Four months later, in March 2017, to investigate human rights abuses in Myanmar, the              
Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact Finding Mission. The           
Myanmar government refused to cooperate. In the March 2017 meeting, UNSC members even             
expressed concerns about human rights violations and the humanitarian situation and were            
interested in how the UN could support the peace process.  
Again, between Fall 2017 and Spring 2017, although the Security Council was aware of              
the escalation of violence that was taking place in Rakhine state and the humanitarian and human                
rights situation involving the Rohinyas in Myanmar, yet, no actions were taken by the Security               
Council. The Security Council did not take any action, despite the activism of the SG's Special                
Envoy.  
195  ​Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,”​op. cit. 
196  ​Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,”​op. cit. 
197 ​Security Council Report, ​op. cit. 
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IV. 2017 Genocide and Its Aftermath 
It all escalated on August 25, 2017, when a Rohingya rebel group known as ARSA               
attacked several military posts in Rakhine. The attack on August 25, 2017, left 12 police officers                
dead​198 and sparked a brutal retaliation by the state security forces, unlike the crises in 1991 and                 
2012. Myanmar's military launched the largest and most violent disproportionate attack on            
Rohingya civilians. In terms of death tolls and damages as a result of the violence, between                
August 25 and September 24, 2017, 6,700 to 9,000 people are estimated to have been killed,                
including 730 children under the age of 5 years old; girls and women were gang raped; families                 
were separated; and several hundred Rohingya villages were burnt down. As they were fleeing              
persecution from Myanmar, no one came to their rescue. More than 700,000 Rohingyas are              
estimated to have fled for their lives, seeking refuge in Bangladesh and other neighboring states,               
such as Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Gambia, India, and the United States. By              
March 2019, around 909,000 Rohingya refugees are estimated to be in the camps in Uhkya and                
Teknaf Upazilas, Bangladesh.​199 








198  ​Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,”​op. cit. 
199 ​United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis,”  
April 18, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis.  

























































On 13 September, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the 
Council members on the deteriorating situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. On 26 September, 
Council members were briefed again by Feltman under “any other business”. On 28 September, 
the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General in a public meeting.  
 
On 13 October, at the initiative of France and the United Kingdom, an Arria-formula meeting 
was held in Myanmar, focusing on the situation in Rakhine state.  Former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan briefed in his capacity as the Chair of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 
which was comprised of both Myanmar and international commissioners and published a final 
report on 23 August that included recommendations for improving the situation in the state with 
regard to conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, institution-building and 
development. 
 
On 12 December, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and Special 
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten briefed the Council on 
developments in Myanmar. Representatives from Bangladesh and Myanmar also participated in 
the meeting. In the consultations that followed, besides Feltman and Patten, representatives from 
OCHA, OHCHR, and UNHCR were present.  
 
On 13 February, at the request of eight members of the Council: Equatorial Guinea, France, 
Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US, the Council was briefed by High 
Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi (via video teleconference) and Assistant 
Secretary-General for Political Affairs Miroslav Jenča.  
 
On 14 May, the Council was briefed by Ambassador Mansour Al-Otaibi (Kuwait), Ambassador 
Gustavo Meza-Cuadra Velásquez (Peru), and Ambassador Karen Pierce (UK), the three co-leads 
on the Council’s visiting mission to Bangladesh and Myanmar from 28 April to 1 May. 
 
On 28 August, the Council was briefed by Secretary-General António Guterres, UNHCR 
Goodwill Ambassador Cate Blanchett, and UNDP Associate Administrator Tegegnework Gettu 
on the situation in Myanmar and the Rohingya refugee crisis. 
 
The Council was briefed on 28 February on the situation in Myanmar from Special Envoy 
Christine Schraner Burgener, who visited the country at the end of January. 
 
Under “any other business” meeting on 20 March, Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten provided Council members 
with information on her meetings with Myanmar government officials and the follow-up to the 
joint communiqué signed on 8 December 2018 between the UN and the government of Myanmar 
to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence. 
 
During “any other business” meeting on 2 July, led by Special Envoy Christine Schraner 
Burgener, members raised questions about the situation in Myanmar including likely tensions in 
the run-up to the general elections in 2020, the Rohingya situation, and the continuing clashes 
between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar government forces. The UN’s activities in Myanmar 
were also discussed. 
 
On 21 August, Council members discussed the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar under 
“any other business”. The meeting was requested by Belgium, France, Germany, the UK and the 
US following the Myanmar government’s announcement that it had cleared 3,450 people for 
repatriation on 22 August from a list of 22,000 provided by Bangladesh. On 23 August, there was 
an Arria-formula meeting organized by Germany, Peru and Kuwait on “Mass Atrocity Crimes in 
Myanmar: Where do we stand on accountability?” 
 
The Republic of The Gambia institutes proceedings against the Republic of the Union of 
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V. Post-Genocide Crisis Management 
2017 
In reaction to the genocide, the international regime was systematic in expressing grave             
concern and condemning the violence against the Rohingyas, but also was unsystematic and had              
mixed responses about what should be done, especially with Myanmar, at the national, the UN               
and UNSC, and the regional levels.  
National. Nationally, Myanmar denied the allegations of human rights violations. They           
claimed that its security forces did not target civilians and were responding to attacks by               
Rohingya militants in August. However, the government also blocked independent access to the             
region, including by the United Nations, and impeded delivery of humanitarian aid.​200 Since the              
200 ​Reuters, “Myanmar Military Exonerates Itself in Report on Atrocities against Rohingya,” ​The Guardian​, 




















Myanmar and asks the [International] Court [of Justice, ICJ] to indicate provisional measures 
 
On 4 February, Members referred to the Independent Commission of Enquiry final report that 
had been submitted to the Myanmar government on 20 January. A number of Council members 
urged Myanmar to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the ICJ and to address the 
root causes of the conflicts in Myanmar. Members also referred to the need for Myanmar to 
create conditions for and facilitate a voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the 
Rohingya to Myanmar. 
 
On 14 May meeting, Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener covered recent developments in 
Myanmar, including the democratic transition, the conflict in Rakhine state and Rohingya crisis 
and highlighted the impact of COVID19 on these issues. She also addressed humanitarian access 
issues and regional cooperation.  Following the meeting, the past and present EU Council 
members (Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, and Poland) held a virtual stakeout during which 
they expressed their concern about the military escalation in Rakhine and Chin States and called 
for an immediate, comprehensive and nationwide ceasefire. 
 
On 11 September, the meeting briefed on a range of issues including the need to de-escalate the 
conflict, humanitarian access, the Panglong peace process, accountability, the Rakhine Advisory 
Commission recommendations, the tripartite memorandum of understanding between the 
Myanmar government, UNDP and UNHCR, and the upcoming November elections. While 
members showed some unity over concerns about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
need for conflict de-escalation, it seems they were divided along the usual lines regarding issues 
such as accountability, international humanitarian law and humanitarian access.  
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genocide, many states’ leaders have visited Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazaar,            
Bangladesh, and offered help in the forms of relief supplies and monetary aid for Rohingya               
refugees. While the majority was vague about what should be done, or urged the UN to address                 
it, or pressured Aung San Suu Kyi to condemn the atrocities and address human-rights issues,               
some countries wanted Myanmar to take responsibility and keep them accountable. On the other              
side, several key countries, such as China, India, and the Philippines, supported the efforts of               
Myanmar in safeguarding the stability of its national development.  
Regional​. On the regional level, while regional organizations condemned the human           
rights violations against the Rohingya, there were mixed responses regarding what should be             
done. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation stepped up and proposed a resolution in the              
UNGA, urging Myanmar to end a military campaign against Muslim Rohingya and called for the               
appointment of a UN special envoy, which China, Russia and some regional countries             
opposed.​201 Meanwhile, the EU, as other regional organizations soon followed, pushed for            
general agreement and arrangements being reached between the Governments of Bangladesh and            
Myanmar, to create a sustainable return of the Rohingya and their reintegration into Myanmar              
society as equal members.​202  
UN. ​The GA resolution mentioned earlier was adopted by a vote of 122 to 10 with 24                 
abstentions. It called on the Myanmar government to allow access for aid workers, ensure the               
return of all refugees and grant full citizenship rights to the Rohingya.​203 In addition, it requested                
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/myanmar-military-exonerates-itself-in-report-on-atrocities-against
-rohingya. 
201 ​The Guardian, “China and Russia Oppose UN Resolution on Rohingya,” December 24, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/24/china-russia-oppose-un-resolution-myanmar-rohingya-muslims. 
202 ​Adam Kaznowski, “High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini's Visit to Bangladesh,” European 
External Action Service, November 19, 2017, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/35828/High%20Representative/Vice-President%20F
ederica%20Mogherini's%20visit%20to%20Bangladesh. 
203The Guardian, “China and Russia Oppose UN Resolution on Rohingya,” ​op. cit. 
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that UN Secretary General António Guterres appoint a new special envoy to Myanmar.             
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, UNGA resolutions are non-binding, so Myanmar was not              
compelled to comply. 
On the UNSC level, as illustrated in Figure 14, from September, when the acts of               
genocide were still actively taking place (until September 24, 2017), through December, the             
Council members mostly met and discussed the recommendations for improving the situation in             
the state with regard to conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation,          
institution-building and development. Superpowers themselves had mixed opinions on what          
should be done. The United States wanted to keep Myanmar accountable for their crimes against               
humanity and genocide through the imposition of sanctions, while the United Kingdom and             
France were moderately passive. Meanwhile, Russia and China opposed the U.S. idea. No             
official decisions and actions could have been taken by the UNSC, given this stalemate. As a                
response to blockage or excessively slow procedures at the UNSC, the U.S. pursued action              
against Myanmar on its national level. On December 21, 2017, under the Magnitsky Global Act,               
the U.S. levied sanctions against Myanmar general Maung Maung Soe for violence against             
Rohingya Muslims. The U.S. said Maung Maung Soe was responsible for “widespread human             
rights abuse,” citing credible evidence of mass killings, rapes and villages being burned.​204  
2018 
By 2018, the international regime was a bit more systematic in recognizing the existence              
of a genocide against the Rohingya and the severity of the issue, as a study was published                 
estimating that more than 24,000 Rohingya people were killed by the Myanmar military and the               
204 Matthew Pennington, “U.S. Levies Sanctions against Myanmar General for Violence against Rohingya 
Muslims,” ​Public Broadcasting Service​, December 21, 2017, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-levies-sanctions-against-myanmar-general-for-violence-against-rohingya-
muslims.  
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local Buddhists since the beginning of the genocide on 25 August 2017.​205 The study also               
estimated that over 18,000 Rohingya Muslim women and girls were raped, around 116,000             
Rohingya were beaten, and around 36,000 Rohingya were thrown into fire.​206 Mass graves have              
also been discovered in several parts of Rakhine State.​207 In March and April 2018, a               
Washington-based human rights pro bono law firm, the Public International Law & Policy             
Group, conducted an investigation into the 2017 assault on the Rohingya with a grant from the                
US Department of State.​208 After investigating and conducting 1,024 interviews with Rohingya            
refugees, it found reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity, genocide, and war              
crimes were committed against the Rohingya, with its 15,000 pages of documentation of             
“atrocity crimes” within its companion report.​209  
National. ​Still, Myanmar continued to deny the allegations of persecution against the            
Rohingya and said its military campaign across northern Rakhine State was a response to attacks               
by Rohingya rebels. Authorities in Bangladesh and Myanmar have held discussions aimed at             
repatriation of Rohingya refugees, but the efforts have so far foundered.  
Regional. ​In the 2018 United Kingdom’s Commonwealth Heads of Government          
Meeting, heads called for a halt to all violence, a restoration of normality, and accountability of                
the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights through an independent process of             
205 ​Mohshin Habib et al., “Forced Migration of Rohingya: An Untold Experience,” ​SSRN Electronic Journal​, August 
2018, pp. 2-97, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3242696.  
206 ​ibid. 
207 ​Foster Klug, “AP Finds Evidence for Graves, Rohingya Massacre in Myanmar,” ​Associated Press ​, February 1, 
2018, https://apnews.com/article/ef46719c5d1d4bf98cfefcc4031a5434.  
208 ​Matt Spetalnick, and Jason Szep, “U.S. Accuses Myanmar Military of 'Planned and Coordinated' Rohingya 
Atrocities,” ​Thomson Reuters​, September 24, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-usa-exclusive/u-s-accuses-myanmar-military-of-planned-and
-coordinated-rohingya-atrocities-idUSKCN1M42DY.  
209 Public International Law & Policy Group, PILPG, ​Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed Against The 
Rohingya In Myanmar’s Rakhine State​, September 2018, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/rohingya-report. 
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investigation.​210 They further called for the sustainable return of all such displaced Rohingya             
sheltered in Bangladesh to their rightful homes in Myanmar under UNHCR oversight and they              
called for the creation of the necessary conditions for sustainable return in safety, security and               
dignity. The UK’s Commonwealth Heads also called for action to address the root causes of the                
current crisis, including through the immediate implementation of the Rakhine Advisory (Kofi            
Annan) Commission recommendations. The UK’s Commonwealth Heads also noted the general           
agreement and arrangements reached between the Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar as            
a beginning towards the sustainable return of the Rohingya and their reintegration into Myanmar              
society as equal members. In the 2018 summit, according to Human Rights Watch, the              
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) addressed the Rohingya crisis but focused            
largely on repatriation issues, treating the “humanitarian situation” in Myanmar’s Rakhine State            
merely as “a matter of concern” and disregarding the government’s crimes against humanity.​211 
UN. ​In 2018, the UN has been communicating and working with Myanmar to create              
repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar.​212 On the UNSC level, as illustrated in Figure 14, from               
February to August, the council held three meetings on the situation in Myanmar and the               
Rohingya refugee crisis, but none of them resulted in action by the UNSC. 
2019 
By March 2019, over 909,000 Rohingya refugees were in Uhkya and Teknaf Upazilas             
camps in Bangladesh. On April 4, 2019, overwhelmed by the huge Rohingya population living              
210 The Commonwealth, “Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Communiqué ‘Towards a Common 
Future,” ​The Commonwealth​, April 20, 2018, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/commonwealth-heads-government-meeting-communique-towards-comm
on-future. 
211 ​Human Rights Watch, “ASEAN: Don't Whitewash Atrocities Against Rohingya,” June 19, 2019, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/19/asean-dont-whitewash-atrocities-against-rohingya.  
212 Hannah Beech, “Myanmar and U.N. Agree to Aim for Repatriation of Rohingya,” The New York Times, May 
31, 2018), accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-refugees-return.html. 
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on its territory, Bangladesh announced that it could not continue to host the Rohingyas              
indefinitely, and called for creation of a sustainable return of the Rohingya and their              
reintegration into Myanmar society as equal members.​213 In late 2019, the countries agreed to              
repatriate several thousand refugees, but none in the designated group was willing to return to               
Myanmar. Leaders of the Rohingya community said they will not return until their citizenship              
rights are guaranteed. Meanwhile, the United Nations has criticized the repatriation plans, saying             
that conditions in Myanmar are still unsafe for Rohingya. The United Nations, Human Rights              
Watch, and numerous other humanitarian and human rights groups have concluded that            
conditions [as of 2019] in Rakhine State are not conducive for voluntary, safe, or dignified               
repatriation of Rohingya. Human Rights Watch estimated that “500,000 Rohingya remaining in            
Myanmar are trapped in appalling conditions, confined to camps and villages without freedom of              
movement, subject to ongoing state persecution and violence, and cut off from many basic              
humanitarian services including adequate food, medical care, and education.”​214  
National. As of September 2019, according to the UN, Myanmar was willing to             
repatriate “verified returnees” from Bangladesh.​215 Kyaw Tint Swe, Myanmar’s Union Minister           
for the Office of the State Counsellor, claimed that people who had been living in Rakhine state                 
“have a different legal status.”​216 According to their exclusive standards, those who qualify for              
citizenship will be issued citizenship cards. The rest will receive National Verification Cards             
which he likened to the “green card” issued to immigrants in the United States. According to                
Mr.Swe, some 300 people have already returned to Myanmar of their own volition “despite              
213 ​The Frontier Post, “Bangladeshi PM Calls for Safe Repatriation of Rohingya,” April 4, 2019, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, https://thefrontierpost.com/bangladeshi-pm-calls-for-safe-repatriation-of-rohingya/. 
214 ​Human Rights Watch, “ASEAN: Don't Whitewash Atrocities Against Rohingya,”​ ​op. cit.  
215 ​UN, “Myanmar Willing to Repatriate ‘Verified Returnees’ from Bangladesh,” September 29, 2019, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1048092. 
216ibid 
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obstacles, including killings and threats by ARSA.”​217 The UN demands for “safe zones” were              
dismissed. Mr. Swe called on Bangladesh to faithfully implement the bilateral agreement they             
made on November 23, 2017.​218 As for accountability for the events in Rakhine state, Mr. Swe                
reported that a military investigation is currently underway. 
Regionally, ​there were no notable advancements in 2019. 
UN. ​On November 11, 2019, the Republic of the Gambia instituted proceedings against             
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and claimed                
Myanmar had violated the provisions of the Genocide Convention. Gambia wants the            
International Court of Justice to order Myanmar to “cease any acts that violate the Convention”               
and “implement its obligation to prevent genocide;” “hold individuals who committed acts in             
violation of the Genocide Convention criminally accountable within its domestic legal system;”            
“pay reparations to the victims of the Rohingya, including allowing them to return to Myanmar,               
reinstating their citizenship, and undertaking protection of the group’s human rights;” and            
“demonstrate its intent to not commit further violations of the Genocide Convention.”​219            
Furthermore, Gambia asked the Court to indicate provisional measures.​220 In December 2019,            
217 ​ibid. 
218 ​The 2017 Bilateral ‘Arrangement’ stipulated that the return shall commence within two months. A Joint Working 
Group will be established within three weeks of signing the ‘Arrangement’. A specific bilateral instrument (physical 
arrangement) for repatriation will be concluded in a speedy manner. 
219 ​D. Wes Rist, “What Does the ICJ Decision on The Gambia v. Myanmar Mean?,” ​American Society of 
International Law​ 24, no. 2 (February 27, 2020), accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/2/what-does-icj-decision-gambia-v-myanmar-mean. 
220 ​According to Rist, provisional measures serve as the equivalent of injunctions or even temporary restraining 
orders against a country. The Gambia asked for provisional measures designed to:Require Myanmar to immediately 
stop all acts that could possibly be construed as violations of the Genocide Convention; Require Myanmar to exert 
control over any non-state actors (like militias or paramilitary groups) that might also be committing such 
acts;Require Myanmar to preserve evidence (and explicitly forbid it from destroying evidence) which might relate to 
genocidal acts; Order both The Gambia and Myanmar not to do anything that would further “aggravate or extend the 
existing dispute”;  Require both states to provide regular written reports to the Court about their compliance with 
any provisional measures the Court might order; and Require Myanmar to cooperate with the United Nations and 
any of its bodies that might seek to investigate ongoing violence related to the case. For more information, see D. 
Wes Rist, “What Does the ICJ Decision on The Gambia v. Myanmar Mean?,” ​American Society of International 
Law​ 24, no. 2 (February 27, 2020), accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/2/what-does-icj-decision-gambia-v-myanmar-mean. 
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Aung San Suu Kyi, in the name of the Myanmar government, rejected allegations of genocide at                
the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
2020 — Recent Developments Involving the World Court 
On January 23, 2020, the ICJ first determined that it had “​prima facie jurisdiction.”              
According to American Society for International Law (ASIL), it was to “justify issuing an order               
for provisional measures.”​221 In other words, on a basic level, the Gambia’s case and argument in                
the initial phase was sufficient for the court to argue that it has the authority to preside over the                   
dispute. In response to the Gambia’s 2019 provisional measures request, in 2020 the Court issued               
a preliminary ruling, which ordered Burma to prevent future acts of genocide. Still, according to               
ASIL, even after the Court’s ruling, military strikes against Rohingya populations continued.​222  
As for the next step, both sides need to submit their legal briefs addressing the issues on                 
the merits that are in dispute. Similar to other international cases, the Court will require several                
years to adjudicate these requests. As of November 2020, there were no new updates.  
VI. Rohingya Muslim Crises & The 2017 Genocide 
As seen in the illustrated cases in 1991, 2012, 2016, and the 2017 genocide, these are                
cases of Myanmar’s violation against the human rights of stateless people who were not helped               
by the international institutions that were supposed to help them. Arguably, if any of these               
international institutions or states cared and took action more diligently, as early as 1991 or 2012                
and/or even in 2016, then potentially the atrocities that befell on the Rohingyas, and even the                
2017 genocide itself, could have been prevented. In analyzing the Rohingya Muslim Crises and              
genocide and why the international regime couldn’t protect the Rohingyas, several systemic            
221 ​Rist, D. Wes., ​op. cit. 
222 ​BBC News, “Myanmar Rohingya: UN Condemns Human Rights Abuses,” December 28, 2019, accessed and 
verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50931565. 
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Design Flaws, which were illustrated in chapter 4, were critically at play; namely, Change,              
Hierarchy of World Power and Competition, and lastly, Jurisdiction.  
While tracing and diagnosing the origin and the possible causes behind the Myanmar’s             
crises and the genocide against the Rohingya, I identified two moments— 1962 and 2015— as               
critical junctures ​marked by changes in the political regime, and the beginning of the military’s               
anti-minority form of nationalism, and exclusion policies​. ​Following the definition of critical            
juncture— according to Giovanni Capoccia — 1962 and 2015 are the key points which caused               
and led Myanmar down the path of interethnic conflict and genocide, rather than other possible               
paths of inclusion and peace.​223  
Slow Adaptation to Change. ​One of the critical reasons why the UN could not intervene               
and prevent the military coup in 1962 or end the junta's continued reign in 2015 was because the                  
UN’s framework did not account for volatility of the state's form of government, behavior, and               
policies over time and lacked measures to address it when it happens.  
1962​. This was the first critical juncture, where following the coup, Burma’s form of              
government changed from democratic regime to military regime. With no opposition both            
domestically and internationally, the junta’s rule continued. Its anti-minority form of nationalism            
and exclusion policy practices effectively began when it changed the nation’s constitution and             
passed the Emergency Immigration Act in 1974, which allowed authorities to confiscate            
Rohingyas’ national registration cards (citizenship). Shortly after, it made a new law which             
based citizenship on ethnicity and excluded Rohingya and other minority communities in 1982;             
started denying Rohingya children birth certificates in 1994; issued Rohingyas with a new form              
of identification, known as a temporary registration card or “white card,” which did not serve as                
223 ​Karl-Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam D. Sheingate, ​The Oxford Handbook of Historical 
Institutionalism​, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018, 
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199662814. 
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proof of citizenship in 1995; and lastly, invalidated Rohingya white cards, their only form of               
identification and required them to obtain national verification cards, which incorrectly identified            
them as immigrants from Bangladesh in 2015. By 1982, it successfully engineered a series of               
exclusion policies, which rendered Rohingyas and other minorities stateless. As illustrated           
earlier, it successfully ostracized and supported various violent campaigns and persecutions           
against the Rohingyas in 1991 and 2012, without facing any repercussion or justice either              
domestically or internationally. It was from the 1990s to the early 2000s, where the military               
realized that they needed to get onboard with the democratization train. Through the UN, it               
realized that it was carefully being observed by the UNSC and the only way to maintain power                 
was to share it. 
2015. ​As a second critical juncture in Myanmar, 2015 was supposed to be different. This               
was the critical juncture moment where the regime which previously seemed invulnerable and             
not responsive to outside pressure gave in, and where the creation of a new path could have been                  
possible, preventing the following crises and the 2017 genocide. For instance, as a result of the                
UN and UNSC’s active pressuring the military government regarding democracy, in November,            
Myanmar held a national election. The military tried to brand and align itself with human rights                
and went along with the election because it wanted to avoid sanctions and get the elections                
approved. In effect, following the election, its form of government transitioned from direct             
military rule to civilian rule under a government formed by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National               
League for Democracy (NLD). However, as illustrated in 2016 and genocide in 2017, it was not                
a full democratization, as the military still maintained a lot of power. For instance, when the                
ARSA staged an attack on the police, simply changing the political regime was not enough for                
Myanmar to change its behavior. As they have done in 1991 and 2012, the military have                
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retaliated with widespread campaign of violence of killing people, raping women, and destroying             
Rohingya villages throughout northern Rakhine indiscriminately, which included innocent         
civilians, women, and children. The reasons why this moment did not ultimately turn into a               
critical juncture was because Myanmar's constitution, which the military wrote to legitimize            
itself back in 1974, still gave the military so much power by design, and since Suu Kyi was                  
unable to control and change Myanmar’s dependent path. To maintain the power sharing             
agreement, she had to make a lot of compromises and ended up co-opted by the military.  
Hierarchy of World Power and Competition. ​Several critical reasons why the UN could             
not intervene and prevent the military coup and the junta's reign in 1962 and 2015, the                
humanitarian crises in 1991, 2012, and 2016, and the 2017 genocide can be explained with the                
‘Hierarchy of World Power and Competition’ design flaws: Selective Interest of the UNSC. As              
discussed in Chapter 3, 1962 critical juncture was in the middle of the Cold War era, where both                  
the UN and the UNSC’s functions were limited by the competition that took place in between the                 
United States and USSR (Russia).  
Selective Interest. ​In the post-Cold War era, in the case of Rohingya, although the UN has                
been eyeing Myanmar’s military government and the human rights situation as early as 1991, it               
did not make it to the UNSC’s agenda until 2005. Only after the U.S. raised concerns about                 
Myanmar at the Council’s closed consultations in June, the UNSC showed interest in the              
situation in Myanmar and met more than three times annually from December 2005. From 2005,               
as illustrated in Figure 12, the members of the UNSC seemed to be interested in encouraging                
progress towards an inclusive and democratic political process in Myanmar more than the human              
rights crisis and refugee problem. This was especially evident, when the topic of applying              
“responsibility to protect” in Myanmar came up for the first and the last time in 2008, after                 
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Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar. On May 7, 2008, France asked the Council to consider using               
“responsibility to protect” as the basis for Council action to get aid into Myanmar. According to                
the Security Council Report, this proposal was met with considerable resistance. Although the             
opposing forces or states to UNSC considering the R2P in Myanmar was not specifically stated,               
the fact that there were opposing states exemplify why the UNSC ultimately did not employ the                
R2P in the case of Rohingya and Myanmar. Even after the 2012 and the 2016 crises and the 2017                   
genocide, the UNSC resorted to only meeting to check on the situation, instead of even               
considering the R2P to protect the Rohingyas. Post 2017 Genocide, both the UN and especially               
the UNSC have neither employed any enforcement measures to keep the Rohingyas safe nor              
keep the Myanmar government accountable.​224  
Jurisdiction. ​The last reason why the UN could not intervene and prevent the military              
coup in 1962 and the junta's continued power in 2015, and the humanitarian crises in 1991, 2012,                 
and 2016, and the 2017 genocide can be explained with the ‘Jurisdiction’ design flaw. As               
discussed in Chapter 3, to this day, States have the authority over not only their territory and                 
people, but also powers they delegate to international institutions; and to decide either to accept               
and comply or simply to not comply with international law and norms. 
Since the Junta took over in 1962, one of the ways it has successfully and legally avoided                 
the UN’s intervention in all of its humanitarian crises in 1991, 2012, and 2016, and even the                 
2017 genocide has to do with international treaties. As discussed in Chapter 3. since Myanmar               
did not participate in nor comply with the majority of the UN’s International Human Rights               
Treaties, the UN did not have the legal jurisdiction to intervene in Myanmar’s state affairs.               
224 ​The 2019 case of The Gambia v. Myanmar is an exception, as it was a legal action brought by one state against 
another, in a UN court, but without action by the UNSC.  
  ​Lee 110 
 
Although the UNSC’s power to apply R2P to intervene was an exception to that rule—as the                
UNSC had a lack of interest nor agreement in doing so — Myanmar’s success in avoiding facing                 
any repercussions and the UN’s failure to protect the Rohingya’s human rights and prevent the               
2017 Genocide, alludes to how important the UN’s Design Flaw of lack of jurisdiction problem               
is.  
VII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discussed how even before the 2017 genocide took place, on              
numerous occasions such as 1991, 2012, and 2016, the UN and the UNSC were not only aware,                 
but also had the opportunity to do something to protect the Rohingya and yet did not take any                  
action. The 2017 genocide against the Rohingya Muslims was not just a politically driven state               
led violence against the stateless minority, but an allusion to how incompetent our current              
international human rights regime is in the face of state sovereignty, and furthermore, how              
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 
I. Introduction 
This thesis focused on evaluating the UN’s legal regime’s systemic design and            
capabilities in protecting human rights. Without a doubt, since 1945, with the creation of the UN,                
the world became more interdependent, and the creation of many international human rights laws              
and norms were possible. However, after observing the UN’s past institutional evolution from             
1945 to present, major systemic changes or ​critical junctures, ​and ​human rights instruments and              
documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar conventions that call for              
protection of human rights, on the contrary to the UN’s claim, in practice, human rights are not                 
“universal, inalienable, indivisible, interdependent, equal, and non-discriminatory rights and         
obligations.”​225 In fact, historically, it has never been the case. Furthermore, this thesis contends              
that the current international human rights regime is simply not enough to protect the most               
vulnerable people and their human rights, especially when there is a change at the level of the                 
state and the regime adapts too slowly to change. I identified the three other systemic design                
flaws that also limit the UN’s ability to protect all people in Chapter 4 as Jurisdiction; Hierarchy                 
of World Power; and lastly, Competition. 
Originally, this thesis asked two central questions ‘why couldn’t the UN protect the             
Rohingya’s human rights?’ and ‘who upholds your human rights when you are stateless?’ and I               
have argued it varies theoretically versus in practice. Theoretically, as the international human             
rights regime is a complex collective system involving the states, the regional system, and the               
international system, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, your human rights– especially when you               
are stateless– will mainly vary depending on the state and the region you reside in. As for why                  
225 OHCHR, “What Are Human Rights?,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx. 
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the UN could not protect the Rohingya’s human rights, I argued that the issue was not because                 
the UN lacked any measures or instruments to do so, but rather, the UN could not make those                  
measures and instruments effective in practice. In Chapter 5, I have argued that the UN’s ability                
to protect Rohingyas was limited more critically because of the four systemic design flaws I               
identified: ​Jurisdiction; Hierarchy of World Power; Competition; ​and Slow Adaptation to           
Change​.  
The ​jurisdiction design flaw explains why the UN’s limited jurisdiction in state’s affairs             
and how they treat their citizens is an issue, when dealing with humanitarian crises, and crimes                
against humanity, especially genocide. As discussed in Chapter 5 and the case study, although              
the UN was aware of the ongoing humanitarian crisis that was happening in Myanmar at               
multiple points of time and as early as 1991, all they did was deplore the use of violence without                   
any effective pressure or measure, and focused instead on restoring electoral democracy, instead             
of tackling the humanitarian crisis issue. As this crisis continued before the genocide took place               
in 2017, the level of violence that was used against the Rohingya in 2012 and 2016 should have                  
been enough for the UN to step in. In Chapter 5, I made the argument that if the UN stepped in                     
as early as 1962 or even by 2015, Myanmar could have taken a different path, and this series of                   
violence leading up to the 2017 genocide could have been avoided. However, due to the UN’s                
limited jurisdiction and other design flaws, this crisis and genocide against the Rohingyas were              
possible.  
The ​Hierarchy of World Power ​design flaw describes the uneven membership and            
structure that is based on the hierarchy of power or importance among states. Commonly, many               
look at the UN as an IGO that is based on equal membership, where all states are considered and                   
valued equally. Although this may be partly true in the UNGA, it is not true in other major                  
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organs of the UN, such as the UNSC, which has more direct power to influence and say in global                   
matters. Especially in the UNSC, the P-5 members not only have permanent membership, but              
also hold a veto power, which could override the UNSC and the UN’s decision and action                
altogether. As discussed in Chapter 4, although the usage of the veto by the P-5 superpower                
members varies and has varied at different critical junctures in the international system, each              
veto affected the UNSC’s power dynamic and ability to protect human rights throughout             
multiple international humanitarian crises. In the case of the Rohingya crisis, the power of veto               
was never used only because the UNSC never passed the briefing and discussion phase for any                
proposed intervention in particular. However, one can argue as well that the inherent and              
unstated threat of the veto by Russia and China — which objected to all forms of intervention in                  
domestic affairs — that kept intervention off the table in the UNSC, despite the US’s interest (as                 
seen in the use of unilateral sanctions). 
The ​Competition design flaw describes how the designers of the UN did not account for               
states’ erratic behaviors driven by its selective (national) interest and competition. Furthermore,            
they did not account for the possibility of how these states can shape and reshape the UN to                  
better serve their own interests. This design flaw was also apparent in the UNSC’s power               
dynamic and management of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The UNSC was aware of the               
existence of a humanitarian crisis as early as 2005, when the US raised concerns about Myanmar                
at the Council’s closed consultations. While holding annual meetings in Myanmar, in 2008, for              
the first and the last time, the possibility of using “​responsibility to protect​” as the basis for                 
Council action to get aid into Myanmar was proposed by France. In retrospect, using the R2P in                 
2008 would have been appropriate and critical in preventing the later humanitarian crises in 2012               
and 2016 and the genocide from taking place in Myanmar. However, this was met with               
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considerable resistance within the Council. Although the information about which countries were            
in the resistance force was not made public, some scholars, such as Nishikawa, argued that the                
UNSC most likely did not intervene because members of the Association of Southeast Asian              
Nations (ASEAN) wanted to avoid addressing it collectively. This was because the principle of              
non-intervention has been maintained in intra-regional relations within Southeast Asia, and since            
they all had cases of human rights violations, internal conflicts or long-sustained violence             
themselves.​226 Following Nishikawa’s analysis and reasoning, the selective interest element of           
competition design flaw was definitely present in the UNSC’s decision making process and it              
explains why the UNSC ultimately did nothing.  
The ​Slow Adaptation to Change ​design flaw points out how the UN cannot effectively              
enforce its human rights protection measures when there are changes within the state, especially              
when states breakdown and/or new states are found; or when a state’s form of government               
changes; or when a state creates a new inclusion or exclusion policy. As discussed in Chapter 5,                 
in Myanmar’s case, there were two critical junctures where there were regime changes and              
exclusion policies– in 1962 and 2015. In between both critical junctures, the Rohingyas were              
rendered stateless and there were numerous cases of human rights violations and suppressions,             
especially in 1974, 1978, 1982, 1989, 1991, 2012, 2015, and 2017. Each of these cases should                
have been opportunities and indicators for the UN to step in, but instead they became the amount                 
of times the UN failed to do so. The UN’s failure to act and to protect the Rohingyas in all these                     
years is an example and result of a ‘slow adaptation to change’ design flaw.  
226 ​Yukiko Nishikawa, “Saving the Stateless? Myanmar, the Rohingya and R2P,” Oxford Research Group, March 
21, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/saving-the-stateless-myanmar-the-rohingya-and-r2ps-limits.  
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II.  Recommendation 
Ongoing Trend & Issues 
Since WWII, we are living in an age of rising nationalism and sovereignty. To illustrate               
some big examples, China and Russia have been pushing against the UN since the 2000s; the                
Trump administration's foreign policy against the UN and NATO from 2016 to 2020; the United               
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, also known as, Brexit in 2020; and currently,              
Hungary and Poland pushing against the European Union (2020). In response to the flows of               
refugees from Syria and Libya into Western Europe, and the flows of migrants from Central               
America through Mexico into the US, there has been a rise of anti-immigrant politics. 
As a result, despite many human rights mechanisms and efforts made, the number of              
asylum seekers, refugees, and the stateless people has only been increasing rapidly over time. As               
of 2019, according to the UN, there are more than 79.5 million people who are refugees, asylum                 
seekers, stateless, and internally displaced people.​227 With no new effective measure, this refugee             
crisis and human rights issues are bound to worsen dramatically as some parts of the world                
become more uninhabitable due to climate change, as well as of other common causes, such as                
persecution, war, and economic crises. As shown in the Rohingyas case, not having citizenship,              
any form of identification, or travel documents makes even immigrating or seeking to become a               
refugee in other states more difficult.  
As of 2020, the international human rights regime does not have any effective measures              
to solve these problems in place. The individual states are not reliable enough to protect them.                
Although R2P was a good initiative, as shown in the Rohingya’s case, it is neither reliable nor a                  
227 ​United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Figures at a Glance,” June 18, 2020, accessed and verified on 
November 29, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html.  
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long term solution. Like R2P, addressing these problems should be an international collective             
responsibility. 
Solution/Recommendation 
My original international policy project idea is called ‘Global Citizenship’ (“Global           
Citizenship” or “Project”). Global Citizenship is an ambitious and radical two-part policy project             
idea, which aims to encourage states to uphold their human rights obligations; address the              
growing problems of statelessness, and refugee crises; and lastly, restore human rights across the              
world (“Goals”). After observing the existence of a wide disparity of human rights across the               
world and tragic humanitarian crises, and examining the current international human rights            
regime and its critical Design Flaws, many of the key principles and ideas of the Project were                 
found. This Project firmly believes the Goals can be achieved by establishing the following, (1) a                
new Global Citizenship status; (2) a special international human rights jurisdiction; (3) neutral             
zones or society; and lastly, (4) a rescue team. In consideration of the sheer magnitude of what                 
this Project seeks to accomplish and the immeasurable amounts of preparations and time, I              
recommend for this Project to be achieved in two parts and employ different strategies. I will                
describe the design and strategies for both two parts and how it could potentially play out.​228 
Part I 
The ​first part is a short term plan, which employs ​soft law​229 ​(“First Part”). The primary                
purpose of this First Part is to introduce the concept of creating a new Global Citizenship status                 
and to gradually gain the support of the UN’s member states and to discover supporter states for                 
228 ​ ​It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop this idea in full, but the thesis is trying to design the broad 
outlines that can be developed further. 
229 ​According to European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, ​Soft law​ is “used to denote agreements, 
principles and declarations that are not legally binding. Soft law instruments are predominantly found in the 
international sphere. UN General Assembly resolutions are an example of soft law.” See more at European Center 
for Constitutional and Human Rights, “Hard Law/Soft Law,”accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, 
https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/hard-law-soft-law/. 
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the ​second part​. The key to accomplish the First Part will depend on and require the support and                  
partnerships with other human rights NGOs, IGOS, and nonprofits. Ideally, with enough support             
and supportive key states, bringing this up as a resolution on the UNGA’s floor will be the next                  
step. While knowing that it is a non-binding measure, I chose to start with soft law because it can                   
accomplish developing common norms more efficiently in the short term, which the hard law              
cannot. Then, only after it makes it to the UNGA’s floor for review and passes, it officially                 
becomes a soft law. Once it becomes a soft law, the next step is to again partner with other                   
NGOs and key states to encourage other states to either join the initiative and/or to uphold their                 
human rights obligations. With this, the First Part is accomplished. 
Part II 
The ​second part is the long term plan, which will take form in more of either a                 
convention and/or a treaty (“Second Part”). The primary purpose of this Second Part is to arrange                
and establish (1) a new Global Citizenship status; (2) a special international human rights              
jurisdiction; (3) neutral zones or society; and lastly, (4) a rescue team. Given the nature of how a                  
convention and a treaty works, although the states will not be obligated to sign on, they will be                  
heavily encouraged to partake in this new initiative to expand the Global Citizen Project given               
how soft law works. 
By the time this project reaches the Second Part, after successively completing the First              
Part, the Project is expected to have a considerable number of supporters ranging from IGOs,               
NGOs, nonprofits, and even states. Any partnering states who sign onto this project will be               
referred to as ‘Partner States.’ Partner States will be asked to help, organize, plan, and support                
this initiative from the take off to until all the goals are met and the neutral zones or societies can                    
self-sustain with their minor involvement. The soft law will help facilitate the dynamic whereby              
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the "Partner" status will be also viewed with prestige and influence among the states. Moving               
forward, this will make it easier to convince other states to sign on in order to share in those                   
benefits and not be left out. 
Global Citizenship Status​. The first main goal is to establish a global citizenship, or a               
special UN protected global citizen status. This new Global Citizenship status will initially             
mainly serve to create an international valid identification document for everyone, including            
stateless people. Although it was mainly designed to help people who do not necessarily have               
citizenship, such as stateless people, and for people who lost all their relevant identification              
documents as a result of fleeing war, persecution, and/or any form of crisis, it will be offered to                  
anyone. Once a person becomes a global citizen, they will be given access to identification               
materials, such as an official ID card, and even passports. As a result, this will clear out one of                   
the biggest roadblocks that the stateless, refugee, and/or asylum seekers face when they are being               
processed in other countries—not having an identity document.  
Special International Human Rights Jurisdiction. In reflection of the ​jurisdiction design           
flaw and to make protecting everyone’s human rights, especially the most vulnerable stateless             
people, easier, I want to make a new special international jurisdiction which will allow the UN                
and/or Partner States to claim and to protect its registered people’s human rights. To give an                
example of how I envision this to play out is, when a Global Citizen is experiencing a violation                  
of their human rights, wherever they may be, the UN or the Partner States will not only have the                   
jurisdiction to claim and rescue them, but also to represent them in the World Court (ICJ) and                 
hold the state responsible for the violation accountable.  
Neutral Zones or Society. ​The third goal of Project Global Citizenship is to establish a               
neutral zone(s) or a society. The backbone idea behind establishing a neutral zone(s) is to create                
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a politically neutral safe haven where Global Citizens can seek refuge and to rebuild their life.                
The partnerships with NGOs, such as Doctors Without Borders, and volunteers from around the              
world will be critical in providing both necessary and rehabilitative services, such as access to               
medical treatment, education, housing, job training, etc. The law and order would be democratic              
and resemble the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as an effective European              
human rights system. After settling and rebuilding themselves, the Global Citizens will have the              
option to either emigrate into other host countries and/or to remain and help build a neutral                
society. Ideally, the neutral zones will develop into a self-efficient and sustainable neutral             
society.  
Rescue Team. ​The fourth and the last goal of project Global Citizenship is to assemble a                
rescue team. As mentioned earlier, there are more than 79.5 million people who are refugees,               
asylum seekers, stateless, and internally displaced people. Among these 79.5 million people,            
there are many similar communities like Rohingyas, stateless or not, experiencing human rights             
violations, and unable to escape such fate. With project Global Citizenship, I want to create a                
specialist rescue team which will advocate and work to help rescue these people. To give an                
example of how I envision this to be implemented is to have these people denounce their current                 
unwanted citizenship and to claim their Global Citizenship, which in turn would allow for the               
special jurisdiction to become legally activated. This would allow for the UN and/or the Partner               
States to fund and deploy a rescue team to aid them. 
III. Conclusion 
My research and evaluation of the current international human rights regime indicates            
that with its current design, it is simply not enough to protect all people, especially the most                 
vulnerable stateless people. From the Rohingya case in particular, I learned that although the UN               
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has the tools but because of its design flaws it is unable to help these people. I started hearing                   
about the Rohingya crisis while I was still in high school. Personally, ‘identity’ is and has always                 
been important to me and my identity as a scholar, but also this project sheds light on an issue                   
and example of how an identity can be politicized. It is emotional on some level and connects the                  
broader issue of human rights to a sense of people being persecuted for being who they are, and I                   
felt a personal connection as a former undocumented immigrant. 
Although Project Global Citizenship in many ways can be viewed as impractical based             
on the amount of financial resources and international partnerships it requires, as American             
baseball manager Tommy Lasorda, once said “the difference between the impossible and the             
possible lies in a man's determination.”​230 It is my goal that someday, we will live in a world                  
where Global Citizenship project and its goals are finished; a world where everyone has some               
place to call home; a world where human rights are respected and protected universally              
regardless of one’s identity; a world with no more genocide and ethnic cleansings; and lastly, a                












Chronology of Major Events from Post WWII to Present 
 
I conducted a chronological analysis in an effort to better understand the UN's             
institutional formation and change from 1945 to present. This also includes but is not limited to                
human rights regime’s growth, genocides, wars, events related to stateless people, treaties,            
diplomatic relations, and many more. For the full list of variables that were identified in the                
chronology, see below.  
Although this chronology was not directly used as charts or figures within the text, I was                
able to gain many insights and trends, which helped identifying and formulating the four design               
flaws. Access to the chronology can be made by clicking or copying the link below. 
 
KEY TO CODING OF THE CHRONOLOGY 
Red:​ ​Genocide, ethnic cleansing, attack on the minority/stateless people 
Orange:​ ​War/Acts of Aggression 
Yellow: ​Important events/Stateless people/displaced people 
Green:​ ​Establishment, events, and/or changes in evolution of International regime 
Blue: ​Treaties, and diplomatic relations 
Purple:​Change in State’s Independence/Annexation/Incorporation/Colonization/Invasion 
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